

Evenings, nights and weekends:

Working unsocial hours
and penalty rates

Tony Daly

Centre for Work + Life
University of South Australia





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Introduction

Technological, economic and demographic changes have contributed to what we now accept as a 24/7 economy and the 'standard model' of working nine to five Monday to Friday, is generally no longer considered standard (Presser, 2003). For example, a shift from a manufacturing-based economy to a service-based economy has resulted in changes in the way people work. In addition, advances in technology allow for greater connectivity to work and greater flexibility, such that the workplace may no longer be a discrete physical location. There are, arguably, associated benefits for employers in terms of productivity and efficiency, and employees in terms of flexibility in when they choose to work. Regardless, the average number of hours worked each week by employees has been decreasing, with OECD (2014) figures showing a decrease internationally by 3.55% and in the decade 2004 (39.5 hours) to 2013 (35.3 hours). There was a reflected trend in Australia, with a 2.43% reduction from an average 37.2 hours per week in 2004 to 36.3 hours in 2013. However, as Charlesworth and Heron (2012) highlight, while there has been an overall decrease in hours worked, the mix has changed. There has been a rapid growth in non-standard work, both part-time and casual, with relatively fewer employees working full-time. Changes in labour market regulation have resulted in a greater focus on greater labour market flexibility for employers and increased productivity and efficiency.

So it appears that there are many benefits associated with greater flexibility in working hours. It can be good for the economy by increasing opportunities for participation in the workforce, and boosting productivity and competition. It can, for example, provide an income for students who might not be able to work Monday to Friday because of their study commitments. It can be helpful for parents in balancing child care and work. Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS; 2013) figures show that around 40% of Australian workers have some form of non-traditional pattern of working hours, whether it's in the evenings or at night, or on the weekend, and often in combination with Monday to Friday work. At first glance, it might appear that greater flexibility in working hours allows greater flexibility in balancing work and life. Unfortunately, it's not that simple.

The association between longer work hours and increased work-life interference has been widely observed internationally (Fagan, Lyonette, Smith, & Saldaña-Tejeda, 2011) and in Australia. The Australian Work and Life Index (AWALI) surveys have consistently found that long working hours (48+ hours per week) are associated with very high work-life interference, and full-time workers consistently report higher work-life interference than part-time workers. The negative work-life effects of long work hours are also consistently observed in these surveys to be worse for women than men.

In this report we expand and deepen this analysis of working time by looking beyond the number of work hours to consider the way in which work is scheduled, which can have a major impact on work-life interference. Like long work hours, unsocial work hours that involve evening, night or weekend work are associated with a range of negative outcomes for health, family and personal relationships (Caruso, 2006; Hook, 2012; Strazdins, Clements, Korda, Broom, & D'Souza, 2006; Wirtz, Nachreiner, & Rolfes, 2011).

In addition to the length of working hours, the scheduling of these hours has the potential to create substantial work-life demands and strains. Working early mornings, evenings or nights not only presents challenges to biological functions such as sleep, it is often incompatible with the rhythms

and schedules of social, family and community activities. This was reflected in the findings from the 2014 AWALI report (Skinner & Pocock, 2014), which showed that frequently working a combination of weekends and nights, or just evenings/nights, was associated with the highest work-life interference. Evening/night work was associated with the greatest negative impact on women's work-life outcomes and working combinations of evenings/nights and weekends had the worst impact on men's work-life interference. In addition, regularly (often/almost always) working Sundays was clearly associated with higher work-life interference, whether combined with regular Saturday work or not.

Work outside standard hours typically attracts premium pay in the form of penalty rates. In this report we discuss working non-standard hours and, in particular, penalty rates: who is paid these rates, whether workers financially rely on these payments, and the implications of their removal or reduction for labour supply. There is currently much public discussion in Australia about penalty rates and whether there remains a case for a pay premium for those who work unsocial hours such as at night, or on Saturday or Sunday, and the appropriate level of these payments. A significant and contested issue in the debate around penalty rates concerns individual choice. Are workers choosing to work unsocial hours as a matter of lifestyle preference or convenience, or are they compelled to work these unsocial schedules as a function of occupational, labour market or economic requirements? Some assert that in a 24/7 economy, working on a Sunday is no longer 'special' or 'unusual' and on this basis some employer organisations have argued strongly against existing penalty rate arrangements. For example, the Chief Executive of the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Kate Carnell, said on 3 June 2014 "I think we have to accept that the train's left the station on this. We don't look at Sundays the way we used to." (cited in McGrath, 2014). In this report we investigate the issue of unsocial hours and penalty rates in more depth, using AWALI survey data collected from workers who regularly work these unsocial hours, some of whom also receive penalty rates.

Structure of this report

This report will begin by briefly describing current policy and research regarding penalty rates. We then describe the AWALI survey which provided the data for this report. We then present key findings from the analysis of the AWALI survey relating to unsocial hours, with a focus on the most common schedules and the workers most likely to work these hours. We will discuss whether workers received penalty rates or additional pay, whether they relied on this extra pay to meet normal household expenses, and whether they would continue to work unsocial hours if they were no longer paid penalty rates. The analysis considers demographic characteristics, such as gender and age, household composition, income and geographic location. We also explore patterns of unsocial work hours and penalty rates according to industry, occupation and type of employment. The report concludes with a summary of key findings and a discussion of implications for policy and future research.

Penalty rates

Penalty rate payments were introduced in the early 1900s as a deterrent against employers using long or abnormal hours, and as compensation for employees' work performed outside 'normal' hours, with Sundays traditionally attracting high rates of pay (Dawkins, Rungie, & Sloan, 1986; Jones, 1981). There have been repeated calls over the last three decades for the reduction or abolishment

of penalty rates, with claims that these higher rates of pay threaten the viability of industry and lead to decreased services and consumers paying increased costs (see Dawkins et al., 1986; McGrath, 2014; Wooden, 1995).

More recently, there have been renewed calls for reductions in penalty rates for working on Sundays (e.g., Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 2012; McGrath, 2014), with much of this discussion stemming from the traditional view of Sunday as a 'day of rest'. This view is being challenged by the changing notions of what constitutes unsocial (often referred to as 'unsociable') working hours and calls for greater individual flexibility in when employees choose to work. In brief, the argument put forward is that standard working hours no longer fit the traditional pattern of 9 to 5, Monday to Friday. Instead, work practices have shifted so that 24/7 arrangements are more common, such that working Sunday is now no different to working Saturday or any other day of the week. Hence, it is argued that working on Sunday does not create substantive disadvantage or impairment, and is therefore not in itself a valid justification for higher pay via the payment of penalty rates.

The research evidence does not support this argument. Recent research indicates that Sunday remains a day for connecting with family and community (Bittman, 2005; Craig & Brown, 2014). Further, findings from AWALI consistently showing that working Sunday is associated with higher levels of work-life interference, significantly more than working Saturdays or weekdays (Skinner, Hutchinson, & Pocock, 2012; Skinner & Pocock, 2014). In addition, a European study found that working one or more Sundays per month was associated with poorer work-life balance and an increased risk of self-reported health impairments (Wirtz et al., 2011). If it is accepted that Saturday working has become more common and if working arrangements are increasingly adopting a widespread 24/7 pattern, it seems counterintuitive that employees would choose to forego their only remaining opportunity for a 'day of rest'. Indeed, a majority judgment by the full bench of the Fair Work Commission (2014) rejected claims from an employer association that the level of 'disability' or disamenity for working on Sundays is no higher than that experienced when working on Saturdays.

The Fair Work Commission judgement also observed that penalty rates supplement base wage rates and they are an important element of the income of those who receive penalty rates (Fair Work Commission, 2014, para. 278). Many who receive penalty rates are low paid employees who are disproportionately dependent upon the minimum pay rates and who use their penalty rates to top up their wages to a reasonable level. There are arguments for reducing the level of penalty rates (particularly for Sunday work) to create additional work opportunities for those who do not currently work unsocial hours. However, paying existing employees lower penalty rates than they currently receive means that they will be significantly disadvantaged, and may need to work additional hours to receive the same income (Fair Work Commission, 2014, para. 283).

We now turn to a brief overview of the data source for this report, the 2014 AWALI survey. This is followed by a detailed description of the analyses and key findings.

The AWALI survey

The Australian Work and Life Index (AWALI) is a national representative survey of the Australian working population that addresses Australians' experience of their working lives. AWALI surveys

have been conducted since 2007. Each AWALI survey contains a core set of items relating to work-life interference, employment and social demographics and an additional set of questions on one or two particular themes. Special themes in the 2014 AWALI survey were flexibility, caring responsibilities other than parenting, and flourishing (positive mental health). Alongside its usual assessment of work-life interference in Australia, the 2014 AWALI included questions addressed to workers who currently receive penalty rates for working unsocial hours (evenings/nights or weekends). Further information is available from the AWALI national reports, accessible from the Centre for Work + Life website (<http://www.unisa.edu.au/Research/Centre-for-Work-Life/>).

The AWALI 2014 sample and methodology

The concepts, methods, literature, measures and pre-tests underpinning AWALI are set out in Pocock, Williams and Skinner (2007). AWALI surveys a randomly selected cross-section of the adult Australian employed population by means of computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI). AWALI surveys different people each year: it is not a longitudinal survey of the same people.

AWALI 2014 was a national stratified sample of interviews conducted over four weekends in March with a randomly selected representative group of working Australians. As in previous years, Newspoll conducted the survey. In accordance with standard Newspoll practice, respondents were selected by means of a random sample process which includes a quota set for each capital city and non-capital city area, and within these areas a quota is set for statistical divisions or subdivisions. Household telephone numbers were selected using random digit dialling, and there was a random selection of an individual in each household by means of a 'last birthday' screening question. The survey sample comprises 2,690 employed persons, consisting of 2,279 employees who received a salary or wage and 411 who were self-employed. Note that total frequencies may vary in the following sections due to sample weighting, rounding and non-response to some items. Overall, the AWALI sample is representative of the Australian labour market at the time of the survey, although there are a few exceptions. Table 1 gives an overview of the AWALI 2014 sample, with Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) comparison figures.

Table 1: Overview of the AWALI 2014 sample (per cent)

	Men	Women	All	ABS
All	53.7	46.3	100.0	Men: 54.2 Women: 45.8
State				
SA	10.9	10.8	10.9	6.9
WA	12.4	12.3	12.4	11.7
QLD	16.4	17.5	16.9	20.3
NSW	28.3	28.3	28.3	31.4
VIC	26.4	25.2	25.8	24.7
TAS	4.0	3.6	3.8	2.0
ACT	1.6	2.2	1.9	1.9
Age group				
18–24	10.2	9.3	9.8	18.3
25–34	14.1	17.8	15.8	25.1
35–44	26.1	26.8	26.4	21.6
45–54	25.2	24.5	24.9	20.3
55–64	16.7	16.9	16.8	12.5
65+	7.7	4.7	6.3	2.3
Highest level of education				
University degree	40.4	43.9	42.0	27.9
TAFE/college	37.1	33.5	35.4	34.7
Secondary school	22.5	22.6	22.6	38.9
Occupation				
Manager	16.8	11.5	14.3	9.9
Professional	25.3	29.3	27.1	22.4
Technician/trade	20.3	2.0	11.8	13.6
Community/personal service	9.6	20.8	14.8	11.1
Clerical and administrative	7.9	22.1	14.5	15.6
Sales	6.2	9.2	7.6	10.4
Machinery operators	7.3	0.8*	4.3	7.1
Labourers	6.6	4.4	5.6	10.0
Type of employment				
Employee	80.9	89.2	84.7	82.7
Self-employed	19.1	10.8	15.3	17.3
Work hours				
Full-time (35+ hours per week)	79.6	48.4	65.2	69.5
Part-time (< 35 hours per week)	20.4	51.6	34.8	30.5

Note: *Estimate unreliable, fewer than 20 cases. ABS = Australian Bureau of Statistics. ABS data sources: Cat. No. 6202.0 Labour Force, March 2014; Cat. No. 6227.0 Education & Work Australia, May 2013; and Cat. No. 6359.0 Forms of Employment, November 2013. ABS data includes those aged 15 years and older.

The AWALI 2014 sample provides a fair representation of employed Australians by gender, state, and work hours. The sample is also reasonably representative by education and occupation, although there is an over-representation of those with higher qualifications, older workers and those in professional occupations. The AWALI 2014 sample slightly under-represents casual and self-employed workers. In the sample 16.7% of employees are employed casually, compared to ABS estimates of 19.4% (ABS, 2013). This probably reflects the inclusion of workers aged 15 to 17 years in ABS surveys, whereas AWALI respondents were aged 18 and older.

Turning now to the household composition, Table 2 shows that the majority of AWALI respondents were partnered (64.4%) and just under half (42.7%) were living in households with children. Of those respondents with children, around one third had a pre-school aged child. Sole parents comprised only a small proportion of the sample (4.1%) and the most common household type was partnered with children (38.6%).

Table 2: Household demographics of the AWALI 2014 sample (per cent)

	All %
Adults in household	
1 adult	18.0
2 or more adults	82.0
Marital status	
Married/de facto	63.9
Divorced, separated, never married or widowed	36.1
Children in household	
No children	54.7
1 child	15.5
2–3 children	28.0
4 or more children	1.7
Ages of children (years) ^a	
≤ 4	14.7
5–12	26.0
13–17	18.6
Type of household	
Single parent	4.1
Couple with children	38.6
Single no children	31.5
Couple no children	25.8

Note: ^a Percentage as proportion of total sample.

AWALI 2014 survey items

Most of the AWALI measures of social and demographic variables used in this report are self-explanatory, with additional information provided in the description of key findings where required. In terms of demographic variables, this report considered employees' gender, age, household composition (e.g., single parent, couple without children), household income and location (city or

rural/regional), industry (e.g., mining, manufacturing), occupation (e.g., labourers, professionals) and type of employment (e.g., permanent, casual).

The AWALI measure of work-life interference comprises five items which assess perceptions of work-life interference focusing on 'general interference' (frequency that work interferes with responsibilities or activities outside work), 'time strain' (frequency that work restricts time with family or friends), work-to-community interference, (frequency that work affects workers' ability to develop or maintain connections and friendships in their local community), satisfaction with overall work-life 'balance', and frequency of feeling rushed or pressed for time. These five items are summed to arrive at an overall work-life index that is scaled from 0 (lowest work-life interference) to 100 (highest work-life interference).

AWALI 2014 included an additional set of questions addressing the scheduling of work and the payment of additional penalty rates for work conducted during non-standard hours. We defined 'standard' as work on weekdays before 9.00 p.m. This is a relatively generous definition of 'standard', as most people would probably still define normal hours as between around 8.00 a.m. and 6.00 p.m. on weekdays.

Non-standard or unsocial work hours were assessed by the reported frequency (never, rarely, sometimes, often, or almost always) with which respondents worked on Saturdays, Sundays, or on evenings/nights past 9.00 p.m., in three separate questions. 'Regular unsocial hours' are defined as responses of 'often or almost always' on any of these measures; responses of working outside standard hours only 'sometimes', 'rarely' or 'never' were defined as not regularly working unsocial hours. As this report focuses on workers who receive penalty rates, all analyses and findings relate only to respondents who were employees; self-employed workers were excluded from the analyses.

Statistical conventions in this report

The following statistical conventions are used in this report unless otherwise specified. Following Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) conventions, full-time employment is defined as 35 or more work hours per week. All contrasts discussed in the text are statistically significant (i.e., not likely to be due to chance) at $p < .05$. The Dunn-Bonferroni correction was applied to multiple comparisons. Note that the following data are weighted, so total frequencies may vary due to rounding and non-response to some items.

As a sample drawn from a much larger population, the estimates presented in this report are subject to a degree of sampling bias; that is, the estimates may be different from the figures that would have been reported had all Australian workers been surveyed. Two strategies have been used to reduce this bias. All reported estimates have been weighted by ABS data on age, highest level of schooling completed, sex and area (capital city and balance of State/Territory) to adjust for differences between the AWALI sample and the Australian population on these key demographics. We also follow the threshold rule used in the *Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia* study (HILDA; Heady, Warren, & Harding, 2006), which sets a minimum of 20 units (i.e., respondents) that must contribute to the value of a cell for that figure to be considered reliable. Estimates that do not meet this threshold requirement are accompanied by an asterisk indicating that the estimate should be interpreted with caution.

Unsocial work hours – key findings

In the following sections we consider when unsocial hours are typically worked and who works them. We begin with gender and age before moving on to household characteristics such as composition, income and geographic location. We then explore patterns of unsocial work hours by type of industry, occupation and type of employment.

When are unsocial hours worked?

Our analysis starts with an overview of the patterns of regular (often, almost always) unsocial hours that were reported by AWALI respondents. As Figure 1 shows, we examine the prevalence of working each of the three categories of unsocial hours (evenings/nights, Saturdays, Sunday), including all possible combinations of these work schedules. The most common pattern for working non-standard hours was Saturdays, with 10.0% of employees working on Saturdays only, followed by the next most common combination of working Saturdays, Sundays and evenings (8.3%). It should be noted that categorising the data to this level of detail increased the number of small cells, thereby limiting interpretability. For example, the Sundays and evenings group comprised only 19 respondents.




Figure 1. Scheduling of unsocial hours (Saturdays, Sundays, Evenings, and combinations thereof), as a percentage of all employees (n = 2,313).

To allow a more nuanced analysis and limit the risk of small cell sizes, the scheduling of non-standard hours was divided into four categories: (a) no weekend or evening work; and often or almost always working on (b) evenings and weekends; (c) evenings only; and (d) weekends only. The following sections describe how these patterns of unsocial hours varied by social and employment characteristics.

Unsocial work hours, gender and age

There were clear gender differences in working unsocial hours (Table 3). Men (41.8%) were more likely to work any type of unsocial hours. Men were also more likely to work evenings and weekends combined, or evenings only. There was no difference between the proportions of men and women who worked only on weekends. Table 3 also shows that younger workers (aged 18 to 24) were more

likely to work weekends only, evenings and weekends, or any type of unsocial hours (57.8%). Those aged 35 to 44 were more likely to work evenings only compared to other age groups.

Table 3: Percent of employees who worked unsocial hours, by gender and by age

	Evening & weekend	Evening only	Weekend only	No weekend or evening	Total <i>n</i>
Gender					
Women	10.6	4.5	18.8	66.1	1,124
Men	15.5	7.0	19.4	58.2	1,190
Total	13.1	5.8	19.1	62.0	2,314
Age (years)					
18-24	17.7	5.6	34.5	42.2	339
25-34	13.4	5.5	14.7	66.4	559
35-44	11.6	7.4	13.0	68.0	500
45-54	12.3	5.0	19.2	63.5	496
55-64	12.1	5.5	18.2	64.2	346
65+	8.3*	2.8*	27.8	61.1	72
Total	13.1	5.8	19.1	62.1	2,312

Note: *Estimate unreliable, fewer than 20 cases.

Unsocial work hours and household composition

In terms of household composition, Table 4 shows that single employees without children (42.7%) were more likely to work any type of unsocial hours, and weekends only. Couples with children were more likely to work evenings only and sole parents were the least likely to work any type of unsocial hours.

Table 4: Percent of employees who worked unsocial hours, by household

	Evening & weekend	Evening only	Weekend only	No weekend or evening	Total <i>n</i>
Household					
Sole parent	8.6*	4.9*	13.6*	72.8	81
Couple, with children	11.2	7.5	14.2	67.1	787
Couple, no children	13.2	4.6	19.5	62.7	636
Single, no children	14.1	4.8	23.8	57.3	644
Total	12.6	5.7	18.6	63.1	2,148

Note: *Estimate unreliable, fewer than 20 cases.

We also investigated men's and women's patterns of unsocial hours within different household compositions. Given the high number of possible groupings and resultant small cell sizes, the analysis was limited to comparing those working any type of unsocial hours (often/almost always) to those who did not work regular unsocial hours. Some of the cell sizes in this analysis were small (< 20 respondents), therefore these findings should be interpreted with caution.

As Table 5 shows, men and women without children were more likely to work unsocial hours. Of those employees who worked some type of unsocial hours, the majority (64.4%) did not have children under the age of 18 and around one third (35.6%) had one or more children. Table 5 also

shows that couples comprised almost two-thirds of employees working unsocial hours. Of these partnered parents, fathers were more likely to work any type of unsocial hours than mothers.

Table 5: Percent of men and women who worked unsocial hours, by household

	Men	Women	Total %	Total <i>n</i>
Household				
Sole parent	0.9*	2.0*	2.9	23
Couple, with children	20.4	12.3	32.7	260
Couple, no children	17.7	11.9	29.7	236
Single, no children	17.7	17.0	34.7	276
Total	56.7	43.3	100.0	795

Note: *Estimate unreliable, fewer than 20 cases. Unsocial hours = often or almost always work nights/evenings, Saturdays or Sundays.

Unsocial work hours, household income and geographic location

As Table 6 shows, those with a combined household income of \$90,000 or more were more likely to work evenings only and those with less than \$60,000 were more likely to work weekends only. There were no other significant patterns evident between household income and unsocial hours. Table 6 also shows that a greater proportion of employees from rural and regional areas (43.1%) worked any type of unsocial hours worked on weekends only, compared to those living in metropolitan areas.

Table 6: Percent of employees who worked unsocial hours, by combined household income and by location

	Evening & weekend	Evening only	Weekend only	No weekend or evening	Total <i>n</i>
Combined household annual income					
Less than \$30,000	11.3*	2.5*	21.3*	65.0	80
\$30,000 – \$59,999	11.7	3.7*	25.4	59.2	299
\$60,000 – \$89,999	14.7	3.9*	16.7	64.7	414
\$90,000 +	13.2	6.7	15.5	64.6	1,126
Total	13.2	5.5	17.5	63.8	1,919
Location					
City	12.0	6.1	17.5	64.4	1,598
Rural/regional	15.5	4.9	22.7	56.9	714
Total	13.1	5.8	19.1	62.1	2,312

Note: *Estimate unreliable, fewer than 20 cases.

Unsocial work hours by occupation and type of employment

With regard to occupational differences, clerical and administration workers (20.2%) were the least likely of all occupations to work any type of unsocial hours (Table 7). A greater proportion of sales workers (59.2%) worked any type of unsocial hours than most other occupations, and they were also more likely to work weekends only. A similarly large proportion of machinery operators and drivers (57.1%) were more likely to work any type of unsocial hours, and more likely to work in the evening and on weekends. Table 7 also shows that employees with casual contracts (48.3%) were more likely to work any type of unsocial hours, and more likely to work weekends only.

Table 7: Percent of employees who worked unsocial hours, by occupation and by type of employment

	Evening & weekend	Evening only	Weekend only	No weekend or evening	Total <i>n</i>
Occupation					
Managers	10.0	5.6*	20.1	64.3	249
Professionals	14.9	7.5	14.2	63.5	572
Technicians & trades workers	7.5	5.3*	24.1	63.2	266
Community & personal service workers	18.4	4.3*	17.3	59.9	369
Clerical & administrative workers	4.6*	3.0*	12.6	79.8	372
Sales workers	16.1	6.6*	36.5	40.8	211
Machinery operators & drivers	25.9	8.0*	23.2	42.9	112
Labourers	15.6	8.5*	20.6	55.3	141
Total	13.1	5.8*	19.1	62.0	2,292
Type of employment					
Permanent or ongoing	13.1	5.6	16.9	64.4	1,711
Fixed term contract	12.4	6.7*	18.0	62.9	194
Casual	13.7	5.9	28.7	51.7	408
Total	13.1	5.8	19.1	62.0	2,313

Note: *Estimate unreliable, fewer than 20 cases.

Unsocial work hours by industry

More than half of the employees in mining, retail trade, accommodation and food services, and the arts and recreation services worked any type of unsocial hours on a regular basis (often or almost always). Table 8 presents a more detailed analysis. The arts and recreation services industry had the highest proportion of employees working weekends only; only 26.5% of this group did not regularly work on weekends or evenings. The accommodation and food services industry had the highest proportion of workers working evenings only, or evenings and weekends combined.

As there are a large number of groups and some cells containing less than 20 respondents, these analyses should be considered only as indicative of possible trends or patterns and interpreted with caution. Aggregating the AWALI frequencies of those who often or almost always work weekends only, with those working evenings and weekends (32.1%) indicates that the AWALI figures are broadly comparable with recent national figures. ABS (2014a) data shows that 31.8% of employees usually worked weekends only, or both weekdays and weekends, as part of their main job.

Table 8: Percent of employees who worked unsocial hours, by industry

Industry	Evening & weekend	Evening only	Weekend only	No weekend or evening	Total <i>n</i>
Agriculture/forestry & fishing	7.3*	1.8*	27.3*	63.6	55
Mining	29.8*	12.3*	10.5*	47.4	57
Manufacturing	7.5*	11.2*	16.8*	64.5	107
Electricity/gas/water & waste services	7.7*	9.2*	16.9*	66.2	65
Construction	4.3*	2.6*	24.8	68.4	117
Wholesale trade	0.0*	0.0*	15.0*	85.0*	20
Retail trade	15.4	6.3*	36.7	41.6	221
Accommodation & food services	30.8	3.7*	29.0	36.4	107
Transport/postal & warehousing	22.2	4.0*	17.5	56.3	126
Information media & telecommunications	14.3	6.1*	18.4*	61.2	49
Financial & insurance services	7.4	2.5*	9.8*	80.3	122
Rental/hiring & real estate services	0.0	4.5*	27.3*	68.2*	22
Professional/scientific & technical services	5.1	6.7*	14.0	74.2	178
Administrative & support services	18.8	5.9*	16.8*	58.4	101
Public administration & safety	9.7	5.3*	8.8	76.1	226
Education & training	8.8	8.4	11.5	71.3	296
Health care & social assistance	18.9	3.5	17.9	59.7	318
Arts & recreation services	18.4	8.2	46.9	26.5*	49
Other services	6.9	0.0	34.5	58.6	58
Total	13.0	5.6	19.1	62.2	2,294

Note: *Estimate unreliable, fewer than 20 cases.

Overview of unsocial work hours

To give a broader view of working patterns, a general category of ‘unsocial hours’ was created to indicate those who often or almost always worked at least some combination of evenings, nights, Saturdays or Sundays. This gave two categories: those who often or almost always worked unsocial hours (e.g., Saturday only or on evenings and Sundays) and those who did not work unsocial hours. A logistic regression was conducted to explore the extent to which all demographic variables predicted whether an employee regularly worked unsocial hours (full results in the Appendix).

Overall, 37.9% (877/2,313) of respondents in the AWALI survey often or almost always worked some combination of unsocial hours. Those who were more likely to work unsocial hours were men, those aged between 18 to 24 years, workers in the arts and recreation services and accommodation and food services industries, and workers in regional or rural locations. Clerical and administration workers were less likely than other occupations to work unsocial hours. There were no differences between other groups within these occupation or industry classifications in the likelihood of working unsocial hours, nor were there differences between the types of household composition or types of employment.

We now turn to an analysis of penalty rates, examining whether employees received penalty rates for working unsocial hours, and the extent to which employees have a financial reliance on penalty rates to meet their household expenses.

Penalty rates – key findings

The following sections report on three items in the AWALI 2014 survey that addressed penalty rates. Respondents who reported any frequency of working on Saturdays, Sundays, or evenings/nights (after 9.00 p.m.) during the preceding 12 months were asked whether they received penalty rates or additional pay when they worked these unsocial hours. Those who reported receiving penalty rates were then asked whether they had a financial reliance on this extra income to meet normal household expenses. These respondents were also asked whether they would continue to work non-standard hours if they were no longer paid penalty rates or additional pay.

The following analyses examine patterns of penalty rates with regard to gender and age before moving on to household characteristics (e.g., single parent, couple without children), income and geographic location (city or rural/regional). We then explore patterns of penalty rates by type of industry (e.g., mining, manufacturing), occupation (e.g., labourers, professionals), and type of employment (e.g., permanent, casual).

Proportion of workers who received penalty rates when working unsocial hours

Overall, 72.2% (1,669 employees) of the total AWALI sample indicated that they worked unsocial hours at any time (rarely, sometimes, often or almost always) during the preceding 12 months, with over half of these unsocial hours workers (54.3%) reporting that they did not receive extra or penalty rates for working outside standard hours. This AWALI estimate exceeds a recent ABS estimate that 25.9% of employees were not compensated for extra hours or overtime (ABS, 2013), but is less than the 67% quoted by Peetz et al. (2003). It should be noted that this question did not account for employees' receipt of other forms of compensation for unsocial work hours, such as above-award payments, time off in lieu or staff discounts, nor are public holidays considered in the AWALI analyses.

A more detailed analysis of penalty rates by type of unsocial hours did not reveal any clear patterns with regard to the likelihood of receiving penalty rates. Table 9 summarises responses according to when non-standard hours were worked. As observed in the previous analyses, some cells contained low numbers of respondents and, therefore, the findings should be interpreted with caution. There were few clear and meaningful patterns to emerge from this analysis other than the observation that those who did not regularly work non-standard hours were less likely to receive penalty rates and they were less likely to financially rely on penalty rates. Those who worked evenings only (42.1%) were less likely to receive penalty rates than employees who worked other types of unsocial hours. Saturday workers were generally less likely to rely on penalty rates for household expenses.

Of those employees who did receive penalty rates for working unsocial hours (45.7%), over one third (34.6%) relied on this penalty rates for household expenses and more than half (62.2%) would stop working non-standard hours if penalty rates or additional pay were not offered.

Table 9: Employees' unsocial work hours, receipt of and reliance on penalty rates, and continued unsocial hours work without payments

	Receive pay %	Total <i>n</i>	Rely on pay %	Total <i>n</i>	Continue if not paid %	Total <i>n</i>
When regularly work non-standard hours						
Weekends	51.4	438	37.8	225	39.7	219
Evenings	42.1	133	47.3	55	34.0	53
Weekends & evenings	55.6	302	48.8	168	38.6	166
No regular weekends or evenings	39.4	796	22.3	310	36.8	304
Total	45.7	1,669	34.6	758	37.8	742
When regularly work non-standard hours						
Saturday only	51.1	231	27.7	119	37.1	116
Sunday only	55.8	43	52.2	23	37.5	24
Evenings only	42.1	133	47.3	55	34.0	53
Saturday & Sunday	50.6	164	48.2	83	44.3	79
Saturday & evenings	42.7	89	44.7	38	39.5	38
Sunday & evenings	42.1*	19	75.0*	8	33.3*	9
Saturday, Sunday & evenings	63.2	193	48.4	122	38.3	120
No regular Sat, Sun or evenings	39.4	796	22.3	310	36.8	304
Total	45.7	1,668	34.6	758	37.8	743

Note: *Estimate unreliable, fewer than 20 cases.

Penalty rates, gender and age

While there were no differences between men and women in the receipt of penalty rates, a greater proportion of women reported relying on those payments for household expenses (see Table 10).

Table 10: Employees' receipt of and reliance on penalty rates, and continued unsocial hours work without payments, by gender and age

	Receive pay %	Total <i>n</i>	Rely on pay %	Total <i>n</i>	Continue if not paid %	Total <i>n</i>
Gender						
Women	44.0	712	39.3	313	38.6	308
Men	47.0	959	31.5	447	37.4	436
Total	45.7	1,671	34.7	760	37.9	744
Age (years)						
18-24	59.4	283	21.5	163	52.8	159
25-34	42.9	394	24.9	169	31.3	166
35-44	38.9	357	43.9	139	29.9	134
45-54	45.2	361	41.4	162	34.8	161
55-64	46.7	227	45.3	106	39.8	103
65+	40.8	49	50.0*	20	42.9*	21
Total	45.8	1,671	34.7	759	37.9	744

Note: *Estimate unreliable, fewer than 20 cases.

Men and women were equally likely to continue working if those payments were not available. Table 10 also shows that workers aged 18 to 24 years were more likely to receive penalty rates, less likely to report financial reliance on these payments, and more likely to continue working if penalty rates were not offered.

Penalty rates and household composition

Single employees were more likely to receive penalty rates than couples (see Table 11). Sole parents were more likely to rely financially on penalty rates, followed by couples with children, child-free couples and single employees with no children. The latter were also more likely to continue working if penalty rates were not offered.

Table 11: Employees' receipt of and reliance on penalty rates, and continued unsocial hours work without payments, by household

	Receive pay %	Total <i>n</i>	Rely on pay %	Total <i>n</i>	Continue if not paid %	Total <i>n</i>
Household						
Sole parent	50.0	48	52.2*	23	30.4*	23
Couple, with children	40.4	560	41.2	226	35.6	222
Couple, no children	38.9	460	36.0	178	31.0	174
Single, no children	51.8	471	29.5	244	39.2	240
Total	43.7	1,539	35.9	671	35.5	659

Note: *Estimate unreliable, fewer than 20 cases.

Penalty rates, household income and geographic location

As Table 12 shows, employees whose combined household income was at or above \$90,000 were less likely to receive or rely on penalty rates, and more likely to continue working without those payments. Those with household incomes below \$30,000 were more likely to rely on penalty rates and less likely to continue working if penalty rates were not offered. Employees in rural or regional locations were generally more likely to receive and rely on penalty rates.

Table 12: Employees' receipt of and reliance on penalty rates, and continued unsocial hours work without payments, by combined household income and by location

	Receive pay %	Total <i>n</i>	Rely on pay %	Total <i>n</i>	Continue if not paid %	Total <i>n</i>
Combined household annual income						
Less than \$30,000	54.3	46	52.0*	25	48.0*	25
\$30,000 – \$59,999	59.1	203	45.4	119	38.1	118
\$60,000 – \$89,999	56.0	277	40.9	154	42.8	152
\$90,000 +	38.0	857	27.1	325	32.3	319
Total	45.3	1,383	35.0	623	36.6	614
Location						
City	42.9	1,157	33.3	493	37.6	481
Rural/regional	52.1	514	37.2	266	38.2	262
Total	45.7	1,671	34.7	759	37.8	743

Note: *Estimate unreliable, fewer than 20 cases.

Penalty rates by occupation and type of employment

With regard to occupational patterns, Table 13 shows that machinery operators and drivers, labourers, and technicians and trades workers were more likely to receive penalty rates for work outside standard hours, whereas managers were least likely. Managers were also least likely to rely on penalty rates to cover household expenses, with labourers most likely to financially rely on

penalty rates. Sales workers, managers, and professionals were more likely to continue working their non-standard hours if penalty rates were not available. Clerical and administrative workers and technicians and trades workers were least likely to continue working without penalty rates. Table 13 also shows that casual workers were more likely to receive penalty rates for work outside standard hours and to continue working non-standard hours if penalty rates were not available. Workers on permanent or ongoing contracts were more likely than other employment types to rely on penalty rates to cover household expenses.

Table 13: Employees' receipt of and reliance on penalty rates, and continued unsocial hours work without payments, by occupation and by type of employment

	Receive pay %	Total <i>n</i>	Rely on pay %	Total <i>n</i>	Continue if not paid %	Total <i>n</i>
Occupation						
Managers	13.2	205	18.5*	27	48.0*	25
Professionals	33.0	436	32.4	145	47.2	142
Technicians & trades workers	65.9	208	34.6	133	26.7	131
Community & personal service workers	53.3	242	36.2	130	39.1	128
Clerical & administrative workers	45.8	179	34.1	82	26.3	80
Sales workers	55.1	178	30.6	98	48.9	94
Machinery operators & drivers	67.3	98	36.9	65	32.3	65
Labourers	66.0	106	47.1	70	37.7	69
Total	45.6	1,652	34.7	750	37.9	734
Type of employment						
Permanent or ongoing	45.4	1,233	36.8	557	33.3	546
Fixed term contract	31.3	144	26.7*	45	34.1*	44
Casual	54.2	295	29.3	157	54.8	155
Total	45.8	1,672	34.7	759	37.9	745

Note: *Estimate unreliable, fewer than 20 cases.

Penalty rates by industry

Table 14 shows that the likelihood of workers receiving penalty rates for working unsocial hours, and financial reliance on these payments, varied between industries. Those most likely to receive penalty rates were workers in the social assistance, manufacturing and health care industries. Those least likely to receive penalty rates worked in the financial and insurance services and the rental/hiring and real estate services. Financial reliance on penalty rates was most likely to be reported by workers in the agriculture, forestry and fishing industries, and in electricity, gas, water and waste services. Employees in education and training and other services were least likely to report financial reliance on penalty rates. If penalty rates were not available, employees in administrative and support services and rental/hiring and real estate service industries were more likely to continue working these non-standard hours. Workers in the construction and manufacturing industries were least likely to continue working if penalty rates were not available.

Table 14: Employees' receipt of and reliance on penalty rates, and continued unsocial hours work without payments, by industry

Industry	Receive		Rely on		Continue if	
	pay %	Total <i>n</i>	pay %	Total <i>n</i>	not paid %	Total <i>n</i>
Agriculture/forestry & fishing	30.2*	43	53.8*	13	41.7*	12
Mining	36.2*	47	27.8*	18	23.5*	17
Manufacturing	72.2	72	44.0	50	21.2*	52
Electricity/gas/water & waste services	53.5*	43	47.8*	23	31.8*	22
Construction	54.3	92	30.0*	50	16.3*	49
Wholesale trade	45.5*	11	0.0*	5	20.0*	5
Retail trade	56.7	180	32.0	103	52.0	98
Accommodation & food services	52.2	90	42.6	47	63.8*	47
Transport/postal & warehousing	55.3	103	38.6	57	31.6*	57
Information media & telecommunications	50.0	40	31.6*	19	25.0*	20
Financial & insurance services	21.1*	71	26.7*	15	31.3*	16
Rental/hiring & real estate services	18.8*	16	0.0*	3	66.7*	3
Professional/scientific & technical services	29.1	141	14.6*	41	26.3*	38
Administrative & support services	42.9	70	40.0*	30	69.0*	29
Public administration & safety	46.9	145	24.6*	69	31.7*	63
Education & training	17.4	184	22.6*	31	53.1*	32
Health care & social assistance	67.0	224	44.4	151	32.7	147
Arts & recreation services	31.3*	48	33.3*	15	53.3*	15
Other services	33.3*	45	15.4*	13	46.2*	13
Total	45.3	1,665	34.7	753	37.6	735

Note: *Estimate unreliable, fewer than 20 cases.

Summary

When are unsocial hours worked and by whom?

In terms of the unsocial hours that were worked by employees, working only on Saturdays was the most common pattern, followed by the combination of working Saturdays, Sundays and evenings. This may, or may not, have been in conjunction with Monday to Friday work hours. Those more likely to work any type of unsocial hours were a varied group comprising men, younger workers (aged 18 to 24) and single employees without children. In terms of employment demographics, we found that employees on casual contracts, sales workers, machinery operators and drivers, and employees in mining, retail trade, accommodation and food services, and the arts and recreation services were more likely to work any type of unsocial hours. Of these, those in the arts and recreation services and accommodation and food services industries were most likely to work unsocial hours. In contrast, sole parents and clerical and administration workers were the least likely to work any type of unsocial hours.

Employee groups whose mix of unsocial work hours was a combination of evenings and weekends were predominantly men, younger workers (aged 18 to 24) and machinery operators and drivers. Men also featured predominantly in those who worked unsocial hours on evenings only, along with workers aged 35 to 44 years, couples with children and those with a household annual income of \$90,000 or above.

In terms of working unsocial hours only on weekends, this group was more likely to feature younger workers (aged 18 to 24), single employees without children and employees from rural and regional areas. In addition, those earning under \$60,000, employees with casual contracts and sales workers were more likely to work their unsocial hours on weekends only.

Who received penalty rates?

Nearly three quarters of AWALI 2014 respondents indicated that they had worked unsocial hours at some time during the preceding 12 months, with over half of these workers reporting that they did not receive extra pay or penalty rates for working outside of standard hours. There were no differences between men and women in the receipt of penalty rates, but younger workers aged 18 to 24 years and single employees without children were generally more likely to receive penalty rates for working unsocial hours. Those receiving penalty rates were more likely to be on casual contracts or working in rural or regional locations, machinery operators and drivers, labourers, and technicians and trades workers. In terms of industry, workers in social assistance, manufacturing and health care industries were more likely to have received penalty rates.

On the other hand, employees with combined household incomes of \$90,000 were less likely to have received penalty rates. Those least likely to report receiving penalty rates for working unsocial hours were managers, and workers in the financial and insurance services and the rental/hiring and real estate services.

Who relied financially on penalty rates to meet their household expenses?

Of those who received penalty rates for working unsocial hours, over one third relied on this penalty rates for household expenses. Those relying on penalty rates were more likely to be women, sole parents or with combined household incomes less than \$30,000. Employees in rural or regional locations were generally more likely than city workers to rely financially on penalty rates. Labourers and workers on permanent or ongoing contracts were more likely to report relying on penalty rates for household expenses, as were workers in the agriculture, forestry and fishing industries, and in electricity, gas, water and waste services.

Those who were least likely to report financially relying on penalty rates included employees aged 18 to 24 years, those with combined household incomes of \$90,000 or more, and single employees with no children. In terms of occupation, managers were least likely to report reliance on penalty rates for household expenses, as were employees in education and training and other services.

Anticipated labour supply consequences of removing penalty rates

There was a clear relationship between reliance on penalty rates for working unsocial hours and whether employees would choose to continue working those hours, for both men and women. Of the AWALI respondents who received penalty rates for working unsocial hours, over half reported that they would cease working non-standard hours if penalty rates or additional pay were not offered. There were some differences in this pattern when other demographic characteristics were examined. Workers aged 18 to 24 years, single employees with no children and those with combined annual household incomes of \$90,000 and above were more likely to continue working unsocial hours without penalty rates. Sales workers, managers, and professionals were more likely to continue working their unsocial hours if penalty rates were not available, and casual workers were more likely than those on permanent, ongoing or fixed-term contracts to continue working unsocial

hours. In terms of industry differences, employees in administrative and support services and rental/hiring and real estate service industries were more likely to continue working unsocial hours without penalty rates.

In contrast, employees with household incomes below \$30,000 were less likely to continue working if penalty rates were not offered. In terms of occupation, clerical and administrative workers, and technicians and trades workers, were least likely to continue working without penalty rates. Those who worked in the construction and manufacturing industries were least likely to continue working if penalty rates were not available.

Who is most financially vulnerable to the removal of penalty rates?

If we consider that those who relied on penalty rates for their household expenses were at some financial risk if those rates of pay were not available, there are a range of groups at potential risk. Simply as a function of their greater likelihood of financial reliance on penalty rates, women, workers with combined household incomes below \$30,000, and employees in rural or regional locations were at greatest risk. In terms of occupation, labourers relied on penalty rates to run their households, as did workers on permanent or ongoing contracts. Finally, workers in the agriculture, forestry and fishing industries, and in electricity, gas, water and waste services, were likely to have their household finances affected by a removal of penalty rates for working unsocial hours.

It could be argued that those who relied on penalty rates were more likely to continue working unsocial hours, out of financial necessity, if penalty rates were not available. The AWALI 2014 data suggest a more complex picture. Slightly more than half (56.8%) of employees who did not rely on penalty rates for household expenses reported that they would stop working unsocial hours if penalty rates were not offered. In contrast, despite reporting a reliance on penalty rates for household expenses, nearly three-quarters (72.3%) of employees would stop working unsocial hours if penalty rates were not offered. This is counterintuitive. It may be that those who work unsocial hours and rely on the attendant penalty rates are under a powerful financial imperative and would discontinue working these hours if the extra payments were removed, instead moving on to a job that did meet the financial need addressed by penalty rates. The AWALI survey sampled a broad cross section of the working population and, generally speaking, these findings indicate that the choice to work unsocial hours is driven largely by the financial incentive of penalty rates. In any case, the majority of employees would choose not to work unsocial hours if penalty rates were not offered.

Conclusion and recommendations for future research and policy

The AWALI 2014 survey provides an up-to-date profile of Australian employees' patterns of working unsocial hours and the penalty rates they receive for that work. This report illustrates that the working of unsocial hours is varied and widespread, and the relationship between those work patterns and the receipt of penalty rates of pay is complex. We found that around half of employees who worked unsocial hours received penalty rates for that work and that the majority of employees who did receive penalty rates would not continue working unsocial hours if penalty rates were not available. This anticipated decision to cease working these unsocial hours if penalty rates were removed was most apparent for those employees who reported that they relied on penalty rates to meet their normal household expenses.

In summary, this report shows that a significant proportion of employees work unsocial hours and rely on penalty rates, and that many would not work these hours without a pay premium. The report also shows that there are a range of employee groups who may be at financial risk if changes are made to penalty rates. It appears that workers in the agriculture, forestry and fishing industries, and in electricity, gas, water and waste services, were likely to have their household finances affected by a removal of penalty rates for working unsocial hours. Labourers and those on permanent or ongoing contracts were also more likely to financially rely on penalty rates. Finally, it is women, workers with lower household incomes, and employees in rural or regional locations who may be at greater financial risk if policy changes are made to the payment of penalty rates for working unsocial hours.

As AWALI did not survey beyond the simple presence or absence of penalty rates, further research is required to provide evidence to inform policy decisions regarding penalty rates, particularly to avoid disadvantaging employees who are at greater risk. For example, it would be worthwhile to explore whether employees would continue to work unsocial hours if penalty rates were reduced rather than removed, and what the penalty rates threshold might be. Similarly, other studies could ask employees whether their unsocial work hours or penalty rates were related to their only, first or second jobs, or whether they received other compensation or benefits for working unsocial hours, such as time off in lieu, above-award payments or staff discounts. In addition, there is much research scope to explore possible reasons behind individual decisions to work unsocial hours, the financial drivers for any reliance on penalty rates, or specific motivations for decisions to continue working unsocial hours if penalty rates were not offered.

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Appendix

Logistic regression analysis of unsocial working hours (reference category: No unsocial hours)

Predictor	Wald's χ^2	df	<i>p</i>
Gender	6.99	1	.008
Age	12.23	5	.032
Household	1.78	3	.619
Location	4.05	1	.044
Main occupation	42.61	7	.000
Type of employment	2.51	2	.286
Industry	61.06	18	.000
Constant	0.76	1	.384

Note. $R^2 = .09$ (Cox & Snell), $.12$ (Nagelkerke). Model $\chi^2(37) = 190.59$, $p = .000$.

Predictor	B	SE	Wald's χ^2	<i>p</i>	Odds ratio	95%CI
Constant	-0.380	.437	0.76	.384	—	—
Gender						
Male	0.286	.108	6.98	.008	1.33	1.08, 1.65
Female	0 ^a					
Age						
18-24	0.706	.274	6.63	.010	2.03	1.18, 3.46
25-34	0.051	.244	0.04	.834	1.05	0.65, 1.70
35-44	-0.001	.243	0.00	.997	1.00	0.62, 1.61
45-54	0.102	.233	0.19	.662	1.11	0.70, 1.75
55-64	0.045	.239	0.04	.851	1.05	0.65, 1.67
65+	0 ^a					
Household						
Sole parent	-0.276	.260	1.12	.289	0.76	0.46, 1.26
Couple, with children	-0.136	.138	0.98	.323	0.87	0.67, 1.14
Couple, no children	-0.134	.135	0.98	.321	0.87	0.67, 1.14
Single, no children	0 ^a					
Location						
City	-0.204	.101	4.06	.044	0.82	0.67, 0.99
Rural/regional	0 ^a					
Main occupation						
Managers	-0.307	.246	1.56	.211	0.74	0.45, 1.19
Professionals	-0.093	.235	0.16	.693	0.91	0.58, 1.45
Technicians & trades workers	-0.317	.255	1.56	.212	0.73	0.44, 1.20
Community & personal service workers	-0.167	.244	0.47	.493	0.85	0.53, 1.36
Clerical & administrative workers	-1.034	.255	16.46	.000	0.36	0.22, 0.59
Sales workers	-0.049	.310	0.03	.874	0.95	0.52, 1.75
Machinery operators & drivers	0.247	.302	0.67	.414	1.28	0.71, 2.31
Labourers	0 ^a					
Type of employment						
Permanent or ongoing	0.030	.144	0.04	.838	1.03	0.78, 1.37
Fixed term contract	0.282	.201	1.97	.160	1.33	0.90, 1.96
Casual	0 ^a					

Note. ^aReference category, so parameter set to zero. SE = standard error. CI = confidence interval.

Logistic regression analysis of unsocial working hours (reference category: No unsocial hours) (cont.)

Predictor	B	SE	Wald's χ^2	<i>p</i>	Odds ratio	95%CI
Industry						
Agriculture/forestry & fishing	-0.219	.420	0.27	.602	0.80	0.35, 1.83
Mining	0.552	.412	1.80	.180	1.74	0.78, 3.90
Manufacturing	-0.026	.372	0.01	.945	0.98	0.47, 2.02
Electricity/gas/water & waste services	0.008	.406	0.00	.983	1.01	0.46, 2.24
Construction	-0.469	.386	1.48	.224	0.63	0.29, 1.33
Wholesale trade	-0.634	.729	0.75	.385	0.53	0.13, 2.22
Retail trade	0.471	.383	1.51	.219	1.60	0.76, 3.40
Accommodation & food services	0.762	.387	3.88	.049	2.14	1.00, 4.60
Transport/postal & warehousing	0.228	.370	0.38	.539	1.26	0.61, 2.60
Information media & telecommunications	0.136	.439	0.10	.756	1.15	0.49, 2.71
Financial & insurance services	-0.549	.387	2.02	.155	0.58	0.27, 1.23
Rental/hiring & real estate services	0.132	.572	0.05	.818	1.14	0.37, 3.50
Professional/scientific & technical services	-0.417	.354	1.39	.238	0.66	0.33, 1.32
Administrative & support services	0.388	.382	1.04	.309	1.48	0.70, 3.12
Public administration & safety	-0.405	.344	1.39	.239	0.67	0.34, 1.31
Education & training	-0.295	.335	0.78	.378	0.74	0.39, 1.44
Health care & social assistance	0.157	.330	0.27	.634	1.17	0.61, 2.24
Arts & recreation services	1.091	.454	5.78	.016	2.98	1.22, 7.25
Other services	0 ^a					

Note. ^aReference category, so parameter set to zero. SE = standard error. CI = confidence interval.