

**WORKING PAPER - KEEPING CREATIVE:  
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE  
COVID-19 EMERGENCY ON THE ART  
AND CULTURAL SECTOR & RESPONSES  
TO IT BY GOVERNMENTS, CULTURAL  
AGENCIES AND THE SECTOR**

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# Keeping Creative: Assessing the Impact of the COVID-19 Emergency on the Art and Cultural Sector & Responses to it by Governments, Cultural Agencies and the Sector

This report comes out of the research project, 'Keeping Creative', which began in April 2020 in response to the global COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic had just started to shut down or severely curtail globally the activities of the arts and culture sector, especially those organised around live audiences and attendance. This project commenced when the severity of the pandemic, its full duration and impact was not yet clear. The early project scope is itself evidence of this; we assumed in our initial timeline a series of group meetings and face-to-face interviews that were not able to happen within the project timeframe. As a necessary result and given added impetus by the ongoing nature of the lockdowns, the project reoriented towards charting the response by the Australian Federal and State governments to the impact on arts and culture, placing this in a broader comparative context with the responses of New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, France and the European Union more broadly.

The project as initially conceived sought to build-in active face to face consultation with local industry-association partners, including in-kind contribution from ACDC (Emma Fey), NAVA (Esther Anatolitis), and Culture Concepts, Germany (Cornelia Dümcke). As the pandemic escalated we felt this was no longer logistically feasible, but thank all three individuals and organisations for their kind support. The views expressed in this document are entirely those of the three University of South Australia authors. This process of industry consultation continues with the Reset programme of monthly meetings currently underway.

The tables in Appendix 2 are compiled by Alex Cothren, a PhD candidate in Creative Writing and Research Assistant at the Laboratory Adelaide project at Flinders University.

## Authors

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## INTRODUCTION

This report comes out of the research project, ‘Keeping Creative’, which began in April 2020 in response to the global COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic had just started to shut down or severely curtail globally the activities of the arts and culture sector, especially those organised around live audiences and attendance. This project commenced when the severity of the pandemic, its full duration and impact was not yet clear. The early project scope is itself evidence of this; we assumed in our initial timeline a series of group meetings and face-to-face interviews that were not able to happen within the project timeframe. As a necessary result and given added impetus by the ongoing nature of the lockdowns, the project reoriented towards charting the response by the Australian Federal and State governments to the impact on arts and culture, placing this in a broader comparative context with the responses of New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, France and the European Union more broadly.

The research involved tracking policy responses through news media, government announcements, reports, open letters, and academic papers. The timeline was from the onset of the pandemic in January 2020 to December 2020. A detailed timeline of events and initiatives can be found in Appendix 2 that detail restriction announcements alongside policy announcements at both state and federal levels within Australia.

The COVID-19 crisis has had, and continues to have, dire consequences for arts and culture across the globe. While there have been many stories of resilience amongst artists, businesses and institutions, particularly regarding the adaptation to digital delivery of content and the reimagination of in-person events to online platforms, cultural workers continue to struggle in the face of ongoing economic precarity. This situation is exacerbated across much of the global north by the fact that the “cultural workforce was already ‘low immunity’ – a vulnerable body susceptible to almost any kind of economic shock” (Banks 2020, p. 650). While unemployment figures may vary globally and within the arts sector, what is commonly reported is that the arts and cultural sector has been one of the hardest hit (Anatolitis 2020; Meade 2020), and will take the longest to recover – if it ever does (Coates et al. 2020; ABS 2020; Guardian Editorial, 2021). This is due to an interconnected set of circumstances brought about through COVID-19 restrictions. The first is that arts and culture is a sector that often relies upon audience participation and gathering in public locations and venues in large numbers. Second, in Australia at least, very few cultural and creative workers earn enough income from their primary artistic occupation to live on, and as such often engage in paid work unrelated to their artistic practice (Throsby and Peteskaya 2017, p. 9).

In light of this high level of personal and professional hardship globally, different government responses and approaches to supporting their respective arts and culture sectors have demonstrated vastly different levels of governance capacity (research, regulation, delivery, co-ordination) (Anheier et al. 2021) and financial commitment. This report suggests that these different governance capacities in turn reflect marked differences in the ‘value’ or ‘worth’ of the sector in public policy, often including the extent to which art and culture is understood by policy-makers to represent ‘real work’. In some cases, the ways in which various governments have responded to COVID-19 have not only exacerbated pre-existing economic hardships and uncertainties but made this precarity appear precisely as a function of this lack of worth. Whilst some sectors were deemed essential to any national post-pandemic recovery, others were positioned as peripheral, if regrettable, casualties. Arts and culture fell on both sides of this divide.

In Australia, the COVID-19 pandemic heralded an unprecedented return to state governments as powerful actors. With Australia’s internal borders often closed for the first-time since Federation, state governments—both ALP and LNP—took the lead as the key daily leaders of their communities’ largely successful COVID-19 responses. While it was the Federal government who had the power to close international borders, and who acted early to do so, state governments were subsequently the key gatekeepers of whether, and how many, international returnees would be allowed to quarantine in their state, and were the ones driving lockdown decisions. The Federal government was also silent on the issue of targeted support for the arts and culture sector, and seemingly unconcerned by the exclusion of many precarious workers, including large numbers of arts and cultural workers, from the national support structures such as JobKeeper that they raced into place to deal with the crisis.

It is against this largely positive backdrop for state governments, that at the beginning of the pandemic, many art and cultural workers, policy advocates, media commentators and academics welcomed the rapid response by states stepping in as providers of last resort – ‘whatever it takes’ – and acting directly in the public interest, pushing the standard ‘market provision’ approach into the background. Buoyed by positive media stories foregrounding arts and cultural activity as an inspirational unifying force during the early days of lockdown, some in arts and cultural saw the chance for a real re-evaluation of the contribution of the sector, stressing variously its contribution to mental health, community resilience, and the nation’s future economic recovery. Arts and culture needed saving as a viable sector – workers, businesses, institutions, infrastructures – and, the hope was, that as after the crisis, a ‘new deal’ might emerge that would, in Australia at least, reverse over a decade of funding cuts and an accelerating decline in public policy worth for the sector. There is much less of this early optimism now.

Meanwhile, governments internationally have put in place various policy mechanisms to support their arts and cultural sectors, with varying levels of success. Some of these initiatives also include broader employment rescue packages and wage subsidies of varying accessibility to arts and cultural workers, while other governments have opted for sector specific and highly targeted grants and funding allocations, and others still have varying combinations of both these approaches. While there is no 'one size fits all' approach to supporting an arts and cultural sector given its complexity, it is clear some policy mechanisms have far better outcomes than others. Often it is governments who have already well-funded social welfare and arts and culture advocacy bodies (also guilds, cultural agencies, unions and so on) across the entire arts and cultural sector, and who's national and state funding bodies operate at an 'arm's length' from government, that have had better initial (and ongoing) responses to the COVID-19 crisis. These same governments tend to be more positive in their commitment to support their arts and culture sectors in an ongoing way. However, there are fewer instances of 'recovery roadmaps' that offer practical solutions and policy strategies for how governments will (or will not) be supporting the arts and culture sector (particularly the sub-sectors involving live audiences) in the medium to long term.

There are however, three main principles that often underpin good arts policy making. These include: 1) vocal and positive government support and taking a strong position that arts and culture work is 'real work', of substantive public value; 2) a more precise understanding of the sub-sectors that comprise the cultural workforce (particularly the actual numbers of freelance, casual and gig-work employed); and 3) providing sums of money that (when strategically placed) provide real, positive and ongoing financial safeguards that promise security without compromising artistic integrity and creative vision. This report seeks to outline various global policy responses to assess how well such responses have been able to engage with these principles and support artists and cultural workers.

# Impact of Pandemic, and Australian Federal and State Government Responses

## Federal Response

The first confirmed case of COVID-19 in Australia on January 25, 2020, marked the start of unprecedented social and economic disruption. By early March 2020, the Australian Federal government had made the decision to ban all international travel and close the nation's borders. But it wasn't until the stricter social distancing measures of four square metres per person and the lockdown of bars, clubs, theatres, casinos, places of worship, gyms and schools in late March 2020, and with it the cancellation of all public events which require the close gathering of people, that the realities of pandemic disruption began to set in for the majority of Australians. Over 100,000 Australians found themselves unemployed overnight (Worthington 2020), with no timeframes for returning to work.

News reports featured images of thousands of people queuing at Centrelink offices around the country, many of whom had never engaged with the welfare system in Australia before but who were now reliant on government wage subsidies, especially JobKeeper. Daily news briefings from the Prime Minister accompanied by the Chief Medical Officer and an established Emergency National Cabinet became the norm.

The Australian government's rapid and early public health response to COVID-19 set it apart from other similar anglophone nations such as the US and the UK. However, as the months in 2020 wore on, the limits of the Federal government's capacity and willingness to steer the Australian arts and cultural sector through the pandemic were revealed.

It became clear quite quickly that arts and cultural workers across Australia were underserved by the pandemic relief policy mechanisms put in place in early 2020, notably including eligibility for JobKeeper (Eltham 2020). It was also clear that the lack of focus on the arts and culture sector was a continuation of a broader ideological shift in arts and cultural policy since the Liberal National government was elected into power at the federal level in 2013 (and have remained in power since). Since 2013 there have been consistent funding cuts in the federal budget to national arts and culture representative bodies, particularly the Arts Australia Council (see Appendix 1 for a timeline of funding cuts from 2013). The recent folding of the arts portfolio into a 'super ministry'—the Department for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development

and Communications, with Paul Fletcher as minister for the arts also tasked with communications and cyber security – with the subsequent loss of a portfolio identity, is emblematic of the declining importance given by the Australian federal government to the arts and cultural sector. Never a big portfolio, ‘the arts’ had now even disappeared from the Department’s title.

As the sector that has been widely acknowledged to be the hardest hit, and to take the longest to recover (ABS 2020; Coates et al. 2020), it was with incredulity that arts and culture advocacy bodies and unions continuously attempted to argue for direct help from the government through the early stages of the pandemic and beyond. As early as April 24, over 100 advocacy bodies and organisations had penned an open letter to Minister Fletcher asking for action, and in particular calling to attention the diverse employment practices (including project-based employment) that were ignored in the wage subsidy schemes of JobKeeper and JobSeeker:

**We have seen our self-generated income for the year vanish. Work that has taken years to develop has been lost. Livelihoods are jeopardised. Businesses closed. Whether it’s a bookshop, a gallery, a live music venue, a cinema, a theatre, or dance school, Australia’s cultural life is in tatters... We note however that funded organisations comprise a minor segment of the creative, cultural and entertainment industries. Over 90% of our artists, creators and businesses are not in receipt of public funding and are not able to benefit from these measures. (Anatolitis 2020).**

What the above open letter pointed out in the early days of the pandemic was that the Australian federal government’s two main wage subsidy schemes, JobKeeper and JobSeeker, were inadequate for a large proportion of artists and cultural workers because the kinds of frequently precarious and short-term employment contracts commonplace in the sector did not meet the eligibility requirements. When the Media Entertainment Arts Alliance union (MEAA) surveyed their membership, 35% had reported that they were ineligible for both JobKeeper and JobSeeker. Significantly, and in particular, JobKeeper excluded those who did not operate as a sole trader as well as those who did not have the same employer for a period of at least 12-months. As has been argued elsewhere (Pacella et al. 2020), these exclusions to the essential flagship wage subsidies is reflective of the Australian federal government’s poor grasp on what has been termed by some as the ‘peculiar’ employment patterns and practices (OECD 2020) of creative and cultural workers.

<sup>1</sup> Government spending per capita fell by 5% per person in the decade to 2018, even though State and local government funding rose, because Commonwealth Government funding fell by 19% per person. (John Daley (2021) Performing Arts Advocacy in Australia.



As is now well-established (de Peuter 2011; Morgan and Nelligan 2018; Comunian and England 2020) arts, cultural and creative work is more likely to be freelance, seasonal, portfolio-based and can often consist of multiple casual contracts throughout a year with multiple employers, although the exact make-up of this patchwork income varies between sub-sector of the creative industries (Throsby and Petetskaya 2017, p. 87). Some ethnographic research estimates that approximately 81% of all artists in Australia are not 'salaried employees' (Throsby and Petetskaya 2017, p. 88.). While this often-precarious reality for artists and cultural workers is widely understood, this kind of intermittent work pattern, from the onset of the pandemic, was never adequately acknowledged and addressed by the federal government. Given the level of outcry from arts and cultural organisations and advocacy bodies around the exclusionary nature of the eligibility criteria, coupled with the longer history of defunding, it was widely assumed this was less about a lack of understanding and more an ideological decision. A similar situation faced the public Higher Education sector in Australia that was also particularly hard hit by the impacts of COVID-19, particularly the closure of international borders to international students, but whose own pleas to make university employees also eligible for JobKeeper were actively rejected (Brett 2021).

It took over 100 days from the onset of COVID-19 pandemic lockdowns before the Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison mentioned the word 'arts' as it related to any meaningful financial support package, or any kind of rhetoric as a show of support for a sector that was one of the hardest hit. While the June 24 announcement of a \$250M Federal Government Arts and Entertainment Package (AEP, now known as COVID-19 Arts Sustainability Fund & Restart Investment to Sustain and Expand Fund or RISE) sounded prima facie like welcome relief after the rather insubstantial and highly targeted earlier \$27M announcement of targeted support for indigenous arts and regional arts in April. However, some still argued that June announcement remained too little, too late (Jericho 2020). Days before Christmas 2020, an entire six-months after the AEP was announced, it was unclear if any of the funding promised by the federal government has actually flowed into the hands of the arts and cultural workers and organisations who needed it the most (Burke 2020). At the time of writing (April 2021) it appears that at least some of this funding as finally started flowing to those who need it (see the below section on the South Australian context for some further detail).

Below is a listing of all arts-specific policy funding announcements for Australia at the federal and state levels from the onset of the pandemic in early 2020 until the end of the year.

\*All policy announcements/ funding allocations were accurate as of December 31st, 2020.




Figure 1: Australian Federal Arts Policy Data 2020 [Appendix 2, Table 1]

States Total ● Federal Total ● Federal Loans ●




Figure 2: Australian State Arts Policy Data 2020 [Appendix 2, Table 2]

NSW ● VIC ● QLD ● WA ● SA ● TAS ● NT ●

## State Responses

Like much of the policy leadership around COVID-19 in Australia after the initial March lockdown, the provision of financial support for arts and cultural workers, along with public recognition that the arts and cultural sector was particularly affected, were largely spearheaded by state (and local) governments. In large part to fill the gap left by federal funding and in the absence of a national arts or cultural policy, states have taken on an increasing percentage of overall arts and cultural funding in the last decade (Australian Academic of the Humanities n.d.), and they often more tangibly feel the criticisms levelled at them for under-funding arts and culture given their actual proximity to those who are directly affected by such funding choices.


Furthermore, while there is \$250M in funding support by the federal government in the RISE Fund, a high dollar value of the overall support package (\$90M) is in concessional loan arrangements that will need to be repaid by the recipients. Given arts as an ecosystem comprises not just large organisations, but also micro, small and medium sized enterprises unlikely to be in a position to commit to repaying such a loan, this conditional funding further reflects the low level of understanding and support the current Australian Federal government has for the sector. Few other industries badly impacted by COVID-19 have been subject to concessional loan arrangements, and these kinds of arrangements can only benefit larger arts and culture organisations.

State government funding announcements in Australia vary in scale, levels of direct financial support and general understanding of what is a complex sector. In some instances, this funding is not new, merely repurposed. It does, however, at least demonstrate a knowledge that those working in arts and culture have needed far more help than the federal government has been willing to acknowledge either in public rhetoric or in actual financial support. Victoria has, thus far, had the most substantial and understanding approach to support for its arts sector. It goes beyond a 'one size fits all' funding approach and has a mix of strategies for supporting cultural and creative workers, as well large, medium and small-scale cultural infrastructure and enterprises, alongside broader policy intervention that is both arts specific and inclusive of adjacent industries more broadly (Small Business Transformation Grants for Melbourne CBD businesses for example). Notably however, while the scale of Victoria's support for the arts at \$1.68Billion (as announced in their 2020-2021 state budget) represents a record investment in arts and culture, some argue it represents an over-focus on 'crown jewels' arts precincts (Burke 2020), rather than on the workers who actually need to fill these venues (see below for a further discussion on arts infrastructure over-spending). Getting the balance between actual support for individual cultural and creative workers and broader arts and culture infrastructure continues to be

hard get right globally (see also the UK discussion of this report for similar criticisms of over-investment in arts infrastructure instead of arts workers).

## State Arts Budget Allocations 2020-2021 (New Funding Only) (Territories Omitted)

The timeframe of this report (January 2020-December 2020) included the state budget announcements, all mostly occurring in November/December. While this report has made its focus the assessment of arts-specific policy, understanding the state-based contexts of funding allocations for the arts (as determined by respective state governments) helps further illustrate the implications of broader arts policy implications, as well as attitudes and understandings of the creative industries sector at the state level. This is significant in the Australian context given that it was state government intervention, rather than federal government intervention, that provided the initial rapid, emergency financial relief to artists and arts workers during the onset of the pandemic in early 2020 (Pacella et al. 2020). So while state governments in the first instance understood that arts sector workers and organisations were critically underfunded (and ignored) by the federal government and reacted by providing emergency relief grants, how state governments understand their arts sectors more broadly, and the degree to which they have chosen to support cultural and creative workers through ongoing periods of uncertainty is revealed through these new spending allocations. Or perhaps to put this more simply, while COVID-19 may have briefly spurred various levels of government into some kind of action to help the arts sector in a direct way, the fundamental policy change needed has not occurred, and the precarity of the sector is once again invisible to government (Comunian and England 2020).







Figure 3: State Arts Budget Allocations 2020-2021 [Appendix 2, Table 3]

## Discussion: Physical Infrastructure or Cultural Workers?

A brief examination of the various Australian state arts budget announcements in the above table reveals a general trend towards large-scale arts and cultural infrastructure, rather than direct-to-artist grant funding. NSW, for example, has faced criticism for having over-focused on funding large-scale organisations with its \$50M Rescue and Restart funding package:

Approximately 42 arts organisations have been funded through the first tranche of NSW state grants, almost half of the \$12.9M dispersed through the formal grants process went to a single company... The Sydney Theatre Company has secured \$6M of the funds officially allocated so far (Burke 2020).




Likewise in Victoria, which have announced a record amount of arts funding, of the \$1.68B dollars announced, approximately \$1.46B is tied up in new infrastructure and construction. And similarly in South Australia, of the \$235M arts budget (some of which is to be spent over a number of years, not just in 2020-2021), only \$10.2M is geared towards direct funding for artists with the rest allocated to infrastructure and construction. Not listed as state funding within the South Australian context were the South Australian recipients of the federal government's RISE (previously known as AEP) funding program. The successful recipients comprised mostly large-scale operations who directly employ cultural workers (WOMADelaide, Adelaide Fringe, Adelaide Symphony Orchestra, UKARIA, Restless Dance Theatre, Gravity and Other Myths), and their adjacent industries (eg. food and beverage, other event supply chain/logistics businesses). While any financial relief is welcome, particularly for the 2021 Festival season during March, an over focus on large-scale operators at the expense of medium, small and micro-operators/enterprises is to ignore critical sections of arts and culture sector workers. Governments at both state and federal levels have tended to focus on larger arts and culture enterprises or large-scale capital works and infrastructure.

There are a number of reasons for this. The complex nature of the arts and cultural ecosystem can often appear as fragmented and incoherent to government. Identifying large scale organisations and clearly delineated infrastructure building programs is thus an easy move for them. This in turn reflects the lack of research capacity in the sector and within government, with so much of this dependent on out-sourced consultancy, and a parallel lack of internal capacity for delivery and co-ordination. Shrinking arts and culture budgets both inside and outside government, coupled with the systemic outsourcing of local government functions, and, at state level, weak regulatory levers, have weakened cultural policy capacity. So too, the shift towards high-profile events and companies, along with glittery infrastructure programs, reflect a short-term focus of contemporary policy making. Finally, there is also a lack of shared vision between governments who have foregrounded economic benefits of culture and a sector willing to accommodate this language in order to access funding.

2 A study released in April 2021 revealed that in South Australia alone as of January 2021 “men had seen a net gain of 791 jobs since the first COVID-19 measures took force in March 2020. In the same period, South Australian women saw 17,347 job losses that hadn’t recovered.” This, the report authors note, is a direct result of the “gendered” impact of coronavirus on feminised sectors, such as the arts, entertainment, retail and hospitality” (Tomevska 2021).

As we have written elsewhere (Pacella et al. 2020), this over-focus on infrastructure spending as a way to ‘rescue’ the arts sector is emblematic of government policy that contributes to a highly gendered (in favour of male-dominated industries) economic recovery, and does not understand, nor care about the arts as a complex ecosystem of mostly smaller players. Similarly, researchers from the Grattan Institute have commented:

**The three sectors with the most targeted [federal budget] support are all bloke-heavy: construction (more than A\$10 billion so far through the crisis), energy (A\$4 billion), and manufacturing (A\$3 billion). There is also an extra A\$10 billion for transport projects, another boost to construction jobs in the building phase... Unlike past recessions, the worst fallout in the COVID-19 recession has been in services sectors. Yet these sectors received next to nothing in the budget. They are also less likely to benefit from economy-wide supports such as instant asset write-offs because they are the least capital-intensive sectors. (Wood et al. 2020)**



In this way, how the Australian federal budget has approached 'rescuing the arts', has been mirrored in state budgets (put out by both ALP and LNP governments), for example in South Australia, Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland. While funding arts and cultural infrastructure is important, doing so without a broader plan for individual artists, freelancers and casually employed cultural workers only further compromises the capacity of the sector to recover. It is crucial that all levels of governments in Australia (and globally) enact policy interventions that demonstrate an understanding of the arts sector as a complex ecosystem where a 'one size fits all' approach, or an over-focus on the larger, 'blue ribbon' arts organisations and infrastructure spending, will only further fracture the industry. For the arts sector is:

**structured in a unique way in comparison to other sectors. Public cultural institutions and big private players alike rely on an interconnected and interdependent network of freelancers and micro-firms which provide creative content, goods and services. This "ecosystem" is vital to the sector... (OECD 2020)**

This ecosystem of institutions and micro-firms has long resulted in establishing a model of uneven work patterns and economic precarity for the workers that comprise it. There are however, some examples of policy responses that have been far better attuned to the needs of such an adaptive workforce. This is due to 1) vocal and positive government support and a political ideological position that arts work is 'real work'; 2) a more precise understanding of the sub-sectors that comprise the artistic workforce (particularly the actual numbers of freelance, casual and gig-work employed); and 3) sums of money that (when strategically placed) provide real, positive and ongoing financial safeguards that promise security without compromising artistic integrity and creative vision.

## Precarious Employment

There has been widespread global unemployment as a result of the pandemic, and while there have been some countries that have seen higher unemployment rates than others, some are better than others in capturing and thus having strong policy understanding of the employment profile of their arts and cultural sector. That very few countries have the capacity to gather relevant employment and productivity data on those within the arts and cultural sectors - or even to agree as to what that sector consists of or what it is called - inevitably compromises governmental capacity to properly support the sector. Researchers in the UK for example note that:



The fundamental difficulty associated with deriving robust, replicable, sustainable and comparable statistics for the creative industries is that in order to do so, one must use the classic Standard Industrial and Standard Occupational classification systems. SIC and SOC systems are widely used and relied upon for defining sectors, industries, workforces and occupational groups, but they have significant shortcomings, particularly when associated with emerging industries and those that are defined more broadly by the activity that occurs within organisations rather than a pure assessment of output (Creative and Cultural Skills 2011, p. 4).

As we detail below, the only country included in this report's comparative international assessment that does attempt to capture employment data more reflective of the 'ecosystem' nature of the creative industries is Germany. Significantly, this is one of the reasons Germany, in comparison to other nations, is far better placed to implement policy strategies that reflect this deeper understanding of the actual working patterns of the sector (more on this shortly).

An ongoing challenge for good real-world-informed policy in the Australian context, however, remains the poor data available on the reality of portfolio careers, often pulling together casual or part-time work in other precarious and casualised industries such as hospitality and higher education/vocational training. Portfolio working involves simultaneously working on a variety of projects in different places of employment (or self-employment). But even when cultural and creative workers do earn enough yearly income from their primary artistic occupation, it is rarely in the form of stable, salaried income from one single employer. It is more often a combination of freelance work, casual contracts, gig work, grants and royalties (dependent upon sub-sector). All this can lead to tremendous income precarity for artists and other creative workers as has been acknowledged in numerous studies focusing on the generally low incomes of the Australian creative sector (Throsby and Petetskaya 2017; Throsby and Zednik 2010), which estimate that approximately 81 percent of all artists who are not 'salaried employees' (Throsby and Petetskaya 2017, p. 88).

Despite such working patterns becoming increasingly normalised across the workforce, and not just the arts and culture sector, currently available Australian employment data is poorly able to capture this reality. The primary source of sector-specific, individual employment data is the five-yearly national census administered by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). The questions related to employment relate only to your answer to the question: 'In the main

job held last week, what was the person's occupation?' Individual work portfolios balancing a mix of unpaid, part-time, contract, casual, volunteer and internship work as are common in the arts and culture sector are clearly not able to be captured within such a limited and outdated understanding of employment. This gap in our understanding of the realities of contemporary working lives feeds directly into policy mechanisms that poorly understand and support those sectors where this is a common reality.

# Australia's Response in International Comparative Perspective

To gauge the robustness of Australia's response to its arts sector, it is useful to compare it to a range of other OECD nations. While direct comparisons can often be challenging (often due to differing scales and capacity of accurately measuring unemployment within the arts sector), nonetheless there are still ways of assessing targeted policy interventions beyond that of government reported unemployment figures. The methodological approach here was the same as the above section – involving tracking policy responses through news media, government announcements, reports, open letters, and academic papers.

As explained above, the predominance of short-term and otherwise precarious work contract employment patterns has resulted in many artists being excluded from broader wage subsidy programs in the Australian context (and elsewhere such as the UK). However, depending on the design of the wage subsidy, and the level of ideological support of social welfare schemes, there have been some countries that have performed better in supporting those who are non-traditionally employed. Below is a brief snapshot of various other OECD countries and the policy schemes relevant to their arts and cultural workers. What is clear from these snapshot comparisons is that the nature of the arts and culture sector is a complex 'ecosystem', which requires nuanced policy strategies to best support it, rather than a single, broad policy strategy.

## GERMANY

Germany has a highly productive arts sector as well as supportive federal and state governments who frame the 'worth' of arts and culture not as economics but as part of democratic citizenship. For example, in March 2020, Michelle Muntefering, the Germany State Secretary Minister of State at the Federal Foreign Office publicly stated that:

**Freedom of cultural expression and free access to culture is not just 'nice to have'. They are fundamental for our democracies and for the cohesion of our societies. They are a strong backbone of our economies. And they play an important role in achieving SDGs [Sustainable Development Goals]. And therefore, we must join our efforts and protect the**

## cultural sector in this existential moment (Michelle Munterfering, March 2020).

These statements may appear as easy rhetoric, but they often herald – even if they do not guarantee - policy responses that offer genuine economic support. Estimates of turnover losses during the pandemic so far of between €21.7 billion and €39.8 billion (KKKB 2020, p. 3) would have been a compelling enough narrative on its own to spur the German government into action. The German response, however, was framed with particularly strong statements of support (especially in the early stages of the pandemic) by leading cultural policy figures and backed by senior government officials and politicians. Germany's Culture Minister was also vocally supportive of actual economic support in the early stages of the pandemic:

**We know the hardships, we know the desperation. The cultural sector in particular is characterized by a high proportion of self-employed people who now have problems with their livelihoods...[h]elp is coming as quickly and with as little bureaucracy as possible!**  
(Culture Minister Monika Grütters, 25 March 2020)

As such, the economic needs of the workers in the arts and culture sector in Germany were recognised within government, who turned to the arts and cultural sector for policy advice. The contrast with Australia, where arts and cultural advocates were forced to shout from the sidelines simply for the government to recognise the problem (let alone co-devise a solution) could not be clearer.

Also beneficial, in addition to government's explicit statement of the worth of the sector, was a capacity to accurately measure their labour force engaged in various kinds of employment patterns and articulate coherent solutions. The Federal Statistical Office and the Federal Employment Agency provided comprehensive data on the number of people engaged in 'Culture and Creative Industry Employment' (KKKB 2020, p. 4). It is one of the few countries that can provide numbers of employed freelancers in sub sections of the creative industries.

What the table below demonstrates, is not just Germany's largest economic commitment globally to supporting the arts and culture sector, but also an understanding that a 'one size fits all' approach to support for this sector is not successful. These rescue packages do work in concert with broader economic welfare support, tax relief, direct grant support, loans, credit aid and short-term work allowances. Furthermore, a number of the approaches in the policies above indicate the more nuanced understanding of the various sub sections of the creative industries. This approach also reflects a deeper framing of cultural policy as social policy; that

art and culture is not merely a 'luxurious hobby' (Burgess 2020) as suggested by British politician Rishi Sunak, but rather is serious work that benefits not just the economy but society in general.




Figure 4: Germany Arts Policy Data 2020 [Appendix 2, Table 4]

Germany ● Australia ●

## CANADA

In the first wave of pandemic lockdown, the Canadian Council for Arts was in constant contact with the government to advise on how their policy settings were (or were not) providing economic welfare to the arts and culture sector. CEO Simon Brault has said:

I think the role of the Canada Council is both to be, right now, a really good partner of the government... to explain and advocate for the how we apply the universal measures [the federal government is taking] to the cultural sector—and then [to offer] options about how we can prevent the collapse of the sector (Canada Council for the Arts, 2020)

Several broad wage subsidy/welfare schemes were launched: Canada Emergency Response Benefit (CERB), the Canada Employment Wage Subsidy (CEWS) or the Canada Emergency Business Account (CEBA) for all businesses and non-profits. There were similar issues around eligibility criteria preventing self-employed/freelance workers from benefiting as existed in Australia and the UK. Most individuals, arts organizations and groups have not applied or were not planning to apply for the Canada Emergency Response Benefit (CERB), the Canada Employment Wage Subsidy (CEWS) or the Canada Emergency Business Account (CEBA), either because they were ineligible to apply, were not clear on the eligibility requirements or felt they were not in need of these benefits (Canada Council for the Arts, 2020). However, it is important to note that ineligibility to apply does not mean there is no need for these resources:

**There are certain aspects of the sector that remain at risk. For example, a high number of organizations rely on self-employed professionals and others with an annual payroll of less than \$50,000. It should also be noted that many organizations have fixed costs that are not covered by emergency aid measures, such as production costs and venue maintenance. As such, additional measures will be required to help the non-profit arts and culture sector get through this crisis (Canada Council for the Arts 2020, p. 53).**

While the emergency schemes have been useful to a majority of artists, certain sub sectors, particularly performance-based arts and visual/craft artists, will need more tailored policies to prevent their collapse. Furthermore, there are also a high number of arts organisations that will continue to have high fixed costs that are not covered by emergency measures (eg. venue maintenance), and that use self-employed workers rather than paid employees (Canada Council for the Arts 2020, p. 25). Again, the 'ecosystem' nature of the arts and cultural sector, and the various ways in which workers undertake paid work do complicate broad wage subsidy strategies.



Figure 5: Canada Arts Policy Data 2020 [Appendix 2, Table 5]

Canada ● Australia ●

## FRANCE

France’s arts and cultural sector, similarly to Germany, had strong vocal support from their federal government reflective of a government that is, again, ideologically supportive of the arts. France’s Culture Minister reiterated the government’s support as the pandemic wore on throughout 2020:

**The State will stand shoulder to shoulder with [cultural professionals] to overcome this crisis and support them in their adaptation and innovation efforts. Everyone needs, wants culture, even more during this crisis that has affected our ability to come together’ (Culture Minister Roselyne Bachelot, 23 October 2020)**

In addition to also having a highly productive arts and cultural sector, the financial support to workers in the sector has been longstanding. For example, the Intermittents du Spectacle program has been in operation since the 1930s, where if artists work 507 hours over 10 months, or roughly 13 hours a week, the state will match what they earn and pay them during periods of unemployment. This allows freelancers:

⊟ Intermittents are compensated for their work while they are working, but at a much lower rate than they would be if they were on a long-term contract, because they will receive the rest of their pay during their period of unemployment. In addition, employers of intermittents are required to pay into the system, so that the government is not responsible for paying the entirety of intermittents’ salaries, but only subsidizing them (Parenteau, 2014). See also Lazzarato 2017.

not to have to jump from one job to another and have down moments in between jobs, do better jobs, and have families and other things normal workers do – [such as take] holidays. Intermittent workers also benefit from continuous education; workshops are paid for. You’re not penalised for taking time off to improve your craft, you’re incentivised (Thompson 2020).

Subsidy schemes such as this which are supported by not just the government, but also by the larger arts and cultural organisations themselves, are examples of policy settings that understand the ecosystem nature of the arts sector, and the importance and inter-reliance upon freelance workers that comprise it.




Figure 6: France Arts Policy Data 2020 [Appendix 2, Table 6]

France ● Australia ●

## UNITED KINGDOM

Across the UK, at the onset of the pandemic there was quick action in terms of broadening wage subsidy schemes once it became clear that the pandemic was accelerating and that strict lockdown measures were required to stop the spread. However, much like in Australia and Canada as outlined in this report, these broad UK



wage subsidy schemes (Self Employment Income Support Scheme SEISS and Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme CJRS) included criteria that excluded many arts and cultural workers due to the uneven, portfolio working patterns and ways of generating yearly incomes that are so common to the sector (Banks and O'Connor 2020). This is alarming given that according to some estimates, at least 47% of all workers in the UK creative industries sector are freelancers (Easton and Cauldwell-French 2017). This figure for freelance-employment is even higher in some sub-sectors such as theatre. For example, a recent industry survey, COVID-19: Routes to Recovery: An Evidence Based Study of the Freelance Theatre Workforce, found that even though freelancers comprise 70% of the UK theatre workforce, 1 in 3 of the freelance workforce received no support from the SEISS or CJRS schemes; 1 in 4 of the freelance workforce have been unable to access emergency income of any kind, and perhaps even more alarmingly, 1 in 3 say they are likely to leave the theatre industry entirely (Freelancers Make Theatre Work 2020, p. 1).

Research on the impacts of the pandemic on the arts sector in the UK more broadly has found that:

**[many creatives] described experiencing a pressure to somehow maintain an active profile, stay relevant, and find some kind of artistic response to current events – but often with little promise of any tangible reward. Undoubtedly, many creatives have taken opportunities to develop new skills and expand their practice in new ways. But their capacity to actually earn any money from this, or other jobs, remains fundamentally limited (Patrick and Elsdon 2020).**

So while the UK has at first glance appeared have allocated substantial sums of money in their arts and culture sector rescue packages —£1.75 Billion, the majority of the allocation to be spent in England (£1.37B) and the rest dispersed between Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland—much like other national cases discussed previously in this report, the precise details of where this funding goes need to be drilled down into; we need to look beyond the overall monetary value when it comes to arts and cultural policy matter greatly.

In the UK what this reveals is that while there was support for the arts and cultural sector in terms of public rhetoric from the government and, again, emergency funding for large companies and infrastructure, direct financial support for artists (and cultural and creative workers) has yet to materialise. The majority of the funding being allocated to England for example is mostly geared towards arts infrastructure with a large proportion of that being a

concessional loan arrangement that is required to be paid back by the receiving organisation. Much of the rest of these funds are tied to infrastructure projects that in essence are protecting theatre and heritage landmarks; what are often described as the ‘crown jewels’ – Royal Exchange, The Royal Albert Hall, etc – (Thompson 2020). While cultural and arts infrastructure support is important to maintain and develop, doing so without also providing direct economic support for artists ignores the precariously employed freelance workers that work inside such places (Freelancers Make Theatre Work 2020, p. 1). Rather ironically, it seems as though the UK government intends to retain its artistic and cultural physical infrastructure but risks not being able to actually generate and deliver new content required to fill these venues if artists continue to remain unsupported.




Figure 7: UK Arts Policy Data 2020 [Appendix 2, Table 7]

United Kingdom ● England ● Scotland ● Wales ● Northern Ireland ● Australia ●

## Conclusion

This report has documented the responses of Australian State and Federal Governments to the impact of the pandemic on arts and culture and put this in a wider (selective) comparison with other countries.

It is clear that the sector is complex and multi-faceted, presenting challenges to governments and public administration. It is, in one way, highly visible, its celebrities providing photo-op opportunities and, in the form of public and online streaming/subscription services, as woven into the weft and warp of everyday life as many other 'essential services' – often more so. On the other hand, it often struggles to appear as 'essential' and the labour that goes into its making is often poorly understood and undervalued.

From the viewpoint of public administration, employment in the sector can often be seen as 'peculiar'. The OECD noted that in Cultural and Creative Sector (CCS)

**employment and income support measures are not always accessible or adapted to the new and non-standard forms of employment (freelance, intermittent, hybrid – eg. combining salaried part-time work with freelance work) that tend to be more precarious and are more common in CCS (OECD 2020).**

We have seen how this has made the most well-intentioned support measures miss their target. As we know, a key 'peculiar' factor for the arts and cultural sector are the huge numbers of freelancers and small and micro-businesses, often circling around a few large dominating corporations in search of opportunities. In an age of what sociologist Dylan Riley called 'political capitalism' – 'a form of profit-oriented activity in which returns are largely the result of the direct use of political power' (2020:36) – those most able to lobby government effectively are those that win out. It is the 'crown jewels', the 'iconic' institutions and companies, and the big cultural industry players that tend to win out – their voices are louder, the photo-ops more glittering.

In Australia, the lack of a singular, coherent voice for arts and culture is a long-standing excuse for government inaction – 'herding cats' – but in many respects this comes with the territory. Arts and culture is a complex inter-dependent ecosystem of workers and institutions that comprise the whole, alongside those of the different sub-sectors. Investment in the ongoing viability of iconic institutions; income support for individual freelancers; underwriting insurance for the screen sector; direct and ongoing financial support for performance-based artists; organising single points of access for accessing grants and funding; setting up

simple application methods and transparency around successful grants and funding applicants – these were some of the multiple challenges in the sector that required more knowledge, more administrative finesse than the travel vouchers and grants for new houses and renovations offered instead by the Federal Government.

Nonetheless, as this report shows, some countries have been able to manage this complex, patchwork of initiatives - including wage subsidy schemes that cover a range of patterns of ‘peculiar’ employment and support their cultural and creative workers to ensure the whole ecosystem, and thus the whole sector’s, survival. This points, in the first instance, to the capacity of the arts and cultural sector to conduct basic research and make representations to governments, and for governments to respond coherently to these representations, make their own assessment, and intervene effectively in the situation. The capacity for ‘research, regulation, delivery, co-ordination’ (Anheier et al. 2021) in arts and culture fluctuates from country to country (and city to city) but there are clear conclusions in the Australian context. The degradation of the country’s public administrative capacity has been frequently commented upon - its response to both the aged-care crisis and the vaccine roll-out coming after years of failure around the NBN, NDIS, bushfire relief, the Murray-Darling scheme amongst others (Macintyre 2021). Within this the arts and cultural sector have fared badly. In 2014 then Prime Minister Tony Abbott cut the dedicated arts and culture section of the Australian Bureau of Statistics, and a 19% decline per capita in federal funding has had significant impact on the research and policy development resources available to the sector. The severe curtailment of the independence of the Australia Council, its progressive reduction to a government agency, along with the disappearance of a Federal Arts department have only exacerbated this.

The individual states, as we have suggested, fared better, and indeed states and local governments have taken up the slack in arts funding over the last decade. Their relatively flatter power structures do allow more direct representation from the arts and culture sector, which can help frame policy responses better. Melbourne – the city and as the seat of state government – for example, has a far more robust capacity for policy making in this area than the Federal government, though this relates to its political support for the value of the sector. The equivocations around the value of arts and culture, as well as the precedence given to those wielding infrastructural power, has for some time undermined New South Wales’ arts and cultural policy capacity. South Australia has in part benefited from the arts being placed in the office of the Premier and Cabinet, with the vocal support of the premier. But the dismantling of the old ArtsSA and the distribution across the Department for Innovation and Skills mean there is no coherent policy for arts and culture as a whole.

There has been everywhere a disjunction between rhetoric and reality, with governments claiming to support arts and culture in their moment of need, and then fumbling the response – often for the reasons cited above. Yet this research has found that this rhetoric too is important. Governments in Germany, France, the EU, and Canada made strong statements in support of arts and culture, and their importance to the country. The UK often equivocated (Banks and O'Connor 2020; Bakare 2020). In Australia acknowledgement of the crisis in art and culture had almost to be dragged from the Prime Minister, with Paul Fletcher, the minister with oversight of arts funding (among many other portfolio areas), still maintaining that all was well with the response and blaming the MEAA union for misrepresentation. Notoriously, as we have seen, when support was announced it was 'not just' the performers 'but also' the 'tradies' who would benefit (see O'Connor, 2021).

The impact of not performing on those who perform for a living has had enormous consequences not just for their income but for their skills too (Guardian Editorial, 2021). Less easily gauged – its impact and consequences – has been the impact on the sense of self-worth of arts and cultural workers whose government effectively – mostly by omission – decided they were not worth that much. Many of the open letters addressed to politicians published in national newspapers were framed in a sense of shock – we've been doing all this for those in need, to entertain, to move, to enlighten, to make life more liveable – that the government simply did not care (O'Connor, 2020). This removal of a sense of social worth, already there in terms of the decline of federal funding and the peripheralization of arts and culture in public policy, hit home in quite personal ways. Those working in higher education or overseas workers and students experienced similar. The mental health impact of the pandemic is just now revealing itself; the removal of both income and a sense of worth – no weekly clapping, no heroes of the warzone stories, no doing it tough eulogies – will have its own discreet consequences.

The failure of the federal government to adequately support arts and culture might be a mix of incompetence, indifference and ignorance: there's perceived to be no additional votes nor political donations in advocating for arts and culture. But it's a clear there is a more fundamental antipathy to arts and culture which many ascribe to the 'culture wars' – though these wars, what motivates them to what end are often unexamined. However, the disdain for arts and culture also displays a particularly exacerbated aversion to the post-pandemic agenda that many thought they saw coming, and which is on the political agenda in many other countries. That is a return of the state as organiser of 'reconstruction' (Edwards 2021), taking a lead in a 'reset' (Garnaut 2021), an active 'entrepreneurial state' involved in market shaping rather than simply fixing market failure (Mazzacuto 2015; 2018; 2021). This at a moment when a leading economic historian declares Joe

Biden's stimulus as 'the definitive end of neoliberalism' (Perez 2021). This new government spending is focused on dealing with climate change, on technological innovation, and with physical and social infrastructure – all within a commitment to create 'clean jobs'. Crucial here has been spending on social infrastructures of social services, health and 'care', as well as schools and urban amenities. This last has been a focus of most of the centre and left responses to the pandemic – calls to invest in care as being not only desperately required (as with mental health and aged care) but also as a far more effective source of jobs – especially 'pink collar'.

All of this has profound consequences for art and culture after the recession. There are two key challenges. First, the current Federal Australian government is now a global outlier in not buying in to these new macro-economic policy shifts: the new role of the state, the priority of climate change, the need for more active public-private partnership, and the crucial importance of social infrastructure. The recession now busted, the JobKeeper and JobSeeker programs can be scrapped, fossil fuels given their head, the state can offload its capacity onto sub-contracted consultancies and non-state agencies, and money routed through hard infrastructure and the housing market. This might change. The second challenge we think is within the art and culture sector itself. Over a couple of decades it became used to justifying itself in economic terms, or as an adjunct to other social agendas. The kind of thinking necessary to situate itself in this new economic, social and political landscape is just beginning to happen. It's a long road ahead but if it does not happen then the sector will continue to fade away into some skeletal residue of what it confidently set out to be after Whitlam.

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# Appendix 1

Timeline of key events in Australia

Date	Event
7th Sep 2013	Coalition gov elected and Creative Australia is scrapped – \$235M of arts funding (not an overly generous package in the first instance but it was the first federal arts policy Australia had in 19 years).
13th May 2014	PM Tony Abbott and Brandis remove over \$100M from AusCo and ended Creative Australia (even though it had been unanimously voted upon in parliament)
18th Aug 2014	Brandis and AusCo launch a new grants/funding model for the arts and effectively shelve/end Creative Australia
24th Nov 2014	\$254M is cut from ABC and \$35M is cut from SBS over the next 5 years
12th May 2015	Over \$100M is slashed from Australia Council by Brandis. AusCo cancel two of the upcoming grant rounds (there are only four core rounds)
13th May 2016	(Otherwise known as Black Friday) Only 128 small to medium arts companies receive AusCo four-year funding for 2017-2020 out of 262 applications. 65 organisations who had previously received funding miss out.
2nd July 2016	Australia re-elects the coalition who took no arts policy platform to the election (Labour had a \$161M arts policy platform, Greens had \$270M arts policy platform).
10th October 2016	57 vocational creative arts courses lose VET course loan eligibility (as of 2017) because they are deemed 'lifestyle choices'. These include dance, animation, design, acting, journalism, photography and writing.
8th May 2018	Another \$84M is cut from the ABC.
18th May 2019	Coalition government is re-elected (in the face of Labor's most comprehensive arts policy platform in 20 years).
5th Dec 2019	PM Scott Morrison announces that the Department of Communications and Arts is going to be folded into a new/larger portfolio: Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications.
3rd April 2020	Only 95 small to medium arts organisations receive AusCo four-year funding for 2021-2024 (out of 412 EOIs and 162 full applications).
8th April 2020	As the scope of the COVID-19 pandemic becomes clearer the Government vote against broadening the JobKeeper income subsidy to freelance workers in the arts (this includes the Minister for the Arts – Paul Fletcher).

## Appendix 2

Table 1: Figure 1, Australian Federal Arts Policy Data 2020

Policy	Date Announced	Value	Arts Specific/Broad
Targeted Support for Indigenous Arts and Regional Arts	April 9 2020	\$27M	Indigenous arts, regional arts specific and Support Act charity.
Arts Entertainment Package (later changed to COVID-19 Arts Sustainability Fund & Restart Investment to Sustain and Expand Fund-RISE)	June 25 2020	\$250M (90M in concessional loans)	New events (especially through new digital delivery), screen production (funding for insurance), arts organisations, establishment of a 'Creative Economy Taskforce'.
Untitled	September 29 2020	\$22.9M	Cultural institutions 'activity support': <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• \$2.3 million for the Australian Film Television and Radio School</li> <li>• \$2.0 million for the Australian National Maritime Museum</li> <li>• \$2.5 million for the National Film and Sound Archive</li> <li>• \$4.5 million for the National Gallery of Australia</li> <li>• \$5.4 million for the National Library of Australia</li> <li>• \$3.9 million for the National Museum of Australia</li> <li>• \$1.2 million for the National Portrait Gallery of Australia, and</li> <li>• \$1.1 million for Screen Australia</li> </ul>
Restart Investment to Sustain and Expand Fund – (RISE)	March 25 2021	*Additional \$135M to RISE	N.B. Changes to the eligibility criteria of RISE include: Make it easier for multiple businesses and organisations to access the program to put on a show, including pre-production support. For example, it is common in the music industry that a promoter works with an artist, their manager, a sound and lighting provider and various other parties in the lead-up to a concert or tour. Encourage projects from as low as \$25,000.

Table 2: Figure 2, Australian State Arts Policy Data 2020

State	Policy	Date Announced	Value	Arts Specific/Broad
New South Wales	Screen and Arts Rent Relief	April 24 2020	\$6.34M	Arts organisation rent assistance; new works; digital skills development; new screen productions; small grants.
	Rescue and Restart	May 24 2020	\$50M	Not-for-profit arts and cultural organisations.
Victoria	Arts Survival Package	April 25 2020	\$16.8M	Non-government arts and cultural institutions, direct grants (\$5000 for individuals/\$10,000 for micro-businesses/organisation).
	Sustaining Creative Workers	June 17 2020	\$4.2M	Grants between \$4000–\$20,000 for individuals; \$4000–\$40,000 for collectives Development of creative works, content/IP, products and/or services;  Presentation of works, productions, exhibitions, publications or curated programs/festivals delivered in a COVIDSafe manner; professional creatives collaborating with Victorian communities; professional or skills development that positively impact the careers of Victorian creatives; audience engagement and market development activity in a COVID-Safe manner.
	Untitled (Majority of funding for Victorian Music Industry recovery Program)	September 20 2020	\$4.4M	Grants between \$5000 and \$50,000 to support musicians, managers, promoters, road crew to make new work and COVID safe business training; peak bodies development of business development programs; \$200K in grants of up to \$10K for Pride Events and Festivals Fund.
Queensland	Untitled	March 18 2020	\$8M	Rental waivers for arts organisation; increase to Individuals Fund grants and Organisations Fund.
	StART	May 26 2020	\$700K	Individual artists grants creation of new work.
	Arts and Cultural Recovery Package	June 16 2020	\$22.5M	Offsetting revenue losses for live music venues; new live performance productions; digital adaption; regional arts events support.

State	Policy	Date Announced	Value	Arts Specific/Broad
Western Australia	Event Cancellation Relief	—	\$5M	—
	Culture & Arts Organisation Staff Retention	—	\$8M	—
	Sustainability Package	—	\$2.5M	—
	WA Recovery Plan	August 6 2020	\$76M	Redevelopment and upgrading of arts organisations' infrastructure; live performance reactivation (the waiver of hire fees for State Government venues; underwriting of financial risks for live performance interruptions (up to \$9M available).
South Australia	SA Arts Funding	March 24 2020	\$1.5M	Direct grants for individuals (\$5000-\$10,000) for digital development of new work; \$500,000 in supplementary funding for event cancellations.
	Music Industry Support Package	May 16 2020	\$1M	Individual artist grants of up to \$5000/up to \$20,000 for organisations; \$300,000 direct support for The Gov live music venue.
	Arts Recovery Fund	September 24 2020	\$10.2M	Grants of up to \$20,000 for individuals.  Grants of up to \$100,000 are available for groups and organisations, where the primary beneficiaries are professional practicing artists.
Tasmania	Untitled	March 27 2020	\$3.5M	Screen development grants; temporary suspension of Arts Tasmania loans; contemporary musicians' digital production and promotion grants.  (*All applicants will be expected to consider and manage the risks arising from potential future disruption as a result of COVID-19 restrictions.)
Northern Territory	Creative Industries Immediate Response and Resilience Package	March 24 2020	\$2M	Development of online content (Digital Adaptation Package); development of online streaming for Channel NT; new arts works and digital skills development for artists; screen industry support for production-ready content; Indigenous Visual Arts Industry Support Program for Aboriginal Art Centres.

Table 3: Figure 3, State Arts Budget Allocations 2020-2021

State	Value	Policies
New South Wales	\$291M Total	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• \$175M (over 5 years) for Made in NSW tv/ film productions</li> <li>• \$104M Arts and Maintenance Upgrade Fund</li> <li>• \$12M upgrades to State Library of NSW</li> </ul>
Victoria	\$1.68B Total	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• \$1.46B Melbourne Arts Precinct Transformation (new contemporary arts and design gallery, NGV contemporary, and public garden)</li> <li>• \$34.4M for regional creative infrastructure – new and upgraded galleries, performance/creative venues</li> <li>• \$21.1M for local and international screen productions</li> <li>• \$9M for a creative industries survival package (grants for freelancers/microbusinesses, regional touring and contemporary music/First peoples focussed initiatives)</li> <li>• \$19.8M towards capital and operational funding for state-owned cultural institutions and venues for recovery, COVIDSafe planning, outdoor events and performances</li> <li>• \$24M (over 4 years) for Creative Victoria's Cultural Facilities Fund</li> <li>• \$17.2M for summer and autumn outdoor activations, performances and COVIDSafe programs</li> <li>• \$94.5M to support the viability of Victoria's iconic cultural institutions and secure jobs in creative, live music and screen organisations</li> </ul>
Queensland	\$21.5M Total	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• \$175M for continuing construction on new live performance venue at Southbank (only \$21.5M of this figure is new funding)</li> <li>• \$22.5 million Arts and Cultural Recovery Package over two-years (this was announced in June 2020 as COVID-19 relief funding and is not new funding)</li> </ul>
South Australia	\$235M Total	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• \$50M additional funding (total of \$200M) for new Aboriginal Arts and Cultures Centre – Lot Fourteen</li> <li>• \$86.5M (over five-years) for Cultural Institutions, relocating collections from major South Australian cultural institutions to a new, purpose-built facility</li> <li>• \$31.2M (over four-years) for a range of public infrastructure works around Festival Plaza/Festival Centre</li> <li>• \$10.2M Arts Recovery Fund in grants of up to \$20K for individuals and \$100K for groups/organisations in direct support (focussing on artists collaborations, theatre and festival reopening, digital innovation)</li> <li>• \$2.3M country theatre infrastructure upgrades</li> <li>• \$5.4M (over two-years) to expand rebate scheme for post-production, digital and visual effects, and video development (managed by South Australian Film Corporation)</li> </ul>
Western Australia	\$76M Total	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• \$30M upgrade to Perth Concert Hall</li> </ul>
Tasmania	\$4M Total	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• \$2.5M (over two-years) for an arts and cultural support fund <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>~ \$1M towards direct grants for artists/performers</li> <li>~ \$1.5M to support the creation of new work</li> </ul> </li> <li>• \$1M Community Arts and Cultural Development Fund (CACD) (over two-years) to deliver long-term improvements in social health and well-being through partnerships between the arts and non-arts sectors</li> <li>• \$500K (over two-years) for Tasmania's Screen Innovation Fund</li> </ul>

Table 4: Figure 4, Germany Arts Policy Data 2020

Policy	Date Announced	Value [EURO]	Arts Specific/Broad
Emergency Aid 2	March 20 2020 [City of Berlin only]	€27M	Arts targeted - freelance/small business (employing 5 people or less)
GEMA	March 23 2020	€40M  The first payments will be allocated to eligible artists who also perform live and have therefore lost significant earnings amid ongoing global event cancellations. The second batch of revenue will be given to 'individual hardship cases' within the song writing industry.	Musicians (singers, songwriters and composers)
Rescue package for the cultural, creative and media sector	March 23 2020	€50B  In grants and loans for self-employed individuals and small businesses; this includes self-employed artists and cultural businesses. In addition, freelancers will receive social security for six months and will have their rent or house payments covered by the government.	Arts targeted – self-employed/ small business
Neustart Kulture (Restart Culture)	June 05 2020	€1B  €250M to make cultural institutions safe again for reopening. The funds are primarily intended to benefit facilities whose regular operation is not largely financed by the public sector and are intended, for example, for the implementation of hygiene concepts, online ticketing systems or modernization of ventilation systems  €450M to support small and medium-sized private cultural institutions and projects in resuming their artistic work and awarding new contracts to freelancers and self-employed people. These funds are divided by <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• €150M for live music venues, festivals, tour operators and brokers</li> <li>• €150M for theatre and dance (private theatres, festivals, organizers and intermediaries)</li> <li>• €120M for the film sector; the funds mainly benefit cinemas, but additional production and distribution requirements are also financed</li> <li>• €30M for other areas such as galleries, socio-cultural centers as well as the book and publishing scene</li> <li>• €150M digital projects, including at museums</li> </ul>	Arts & culture

Policy	Date Announced	Value [EURO]	Arts Specific/Broad
[Continued] Neustart Kultre (Restart Culture)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• €100M for regularly funded cultural institutions to compensate for corona-related loss of income and additional expenditure</li> <li>• €20M for private radio broadcasters</li> </ul>	

Table 5: Figure 5, Canada Arts Policy Data 2020

Policy	Date Announced	Value [C\$]	Arts Specific/Broad
Untitled	March 30 2020	\$60M	Arts organisations specific.
Digital Originals	April 21 2020	\$1M (grants of up to \$5000 max pp)	To develop and create original or adapted works online .
Emergency Support Fund for Cultural, Heritage and Sport	May 08 2020	\$500M (*\$72M for sports)	Arts and sports.

Table 6: Figure 6, France Arts Policy Data 2020

Policy	Date Announced	Value [EURO]	Arts Specific/Broad
Untitled	March 18 2020	€22M <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• €10M National Music Centre</li> <li>• €5M emergency aid live music sector</li> <li>• €5M National Book Centre/ cancelled literary events</li> <li>• €2M national Centre of Plastic Arts gallery support</li> <li>• (undisclosed) Suspension of admission tax for cinemas</li> </ul>	Arts organisations event cancellation relief and in-kind relief (tax suspension)
Untitled	May 06 2020	€50M film fund compensation for screen producers for insurance for 'Covid Risks'  €50M National Music Centre to support entire music industry  Undisclosed amount to extend employment rights of temporary performing artists and technicians to August 2021 (Intermittents du Spectacle)	Direct wage relief to artists; arts organisations support; insurance coverage for screen production that is not presently covered by existing insurers
Untitled	September 03 2020	€2B <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• €40M historic monument restoration</li> <li>• €100M restoration of Villers-Cotterêts</li> <li>• €20M renovation of other heritage facilities</li> <li>• €334M for public heritage institutions to help resume post-COVID-19 activities</li> <li>• €220M National Music Centre</li> <li>• €10M fund for private theatres</li> <li>• €206M subsidised performing arts institutions</li> <li>• €13M artistic employment</li> </ul>	Arts infrastructure



Table 7: Figure 7, UK Arts Policy Data 2020

Policy	Date Announced	Value [STERLING]	Arts Specific/Broad
<b>United Kingdom</b>			
Culture Recovery Plan	July 05 2020	£1.57B <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>£100M for cultural institutions in England and the English heritage Trust</li> <li>£120M capital investment for cultural infrastructure</li> <li>£188M for devolved administrations in NI, Scotland and Wales</li> </ul>	Arts infrastructure
Film and TV Production Restart Scheme	July 28 2020	£500M	Direct compensation to film producers that incur losses as a result of COVID-19 risks (those unable to self-insure) or access indemnity
<b>England</b>			
England Arts Funding	March 24 2020	£160M <p>(£143M reallocation of National Lottery Project Grants, and Developing Your Creative Practice &amp; Development Funds for 2020/2021 period)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>£20M in cash grants of up to £2,500 for artists</li> <li>£90M for National Portfolio Organisations and Creative People and Places organisations</li> <li>£50M for organisations outside NPO of individual grants of up to £35,000</li> </ul>	Direct funding for artists and arts organisations
Culture Recovery Plan – England	July 05 2020	£1.37B <p>(of £1.57B for the UK)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>£270M of repayable finance and £880M in grants for cultural institutions</li> <li>£100M targeted support for national cultural institutions in England and the English heritage Trust</li> <li>£120M capital investment to restart construction on cultural infrastructure and heritage construction projects paused due to COVID-19 (this figure is inclusive of £55M for Cultural Capital Kickstart Fund).</li> </ul>	Arts infrastructure

Policy	Date Announced	Value [STERLING]	Arts Specific/Broad
<b>Scotland</b>			
Untitled	March 27 2020	£13M (1M top up added 21st April) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>£4M for Creative Scotland Bridging Bursary Fund for freelancers one-off payment between £500-£2,500</li> <li>£1.5M for Screen Scotland Bridging Bursary for one-off bursaries of £500-£2,500 to freelance, PAYE and self-employed screen sector workers who experienced immediate loss of income</li> <li>£7.5M for Open Funding: Sustaining Creative Development</li> </ul>	Direct funding to artists
Grassroots Music Venues Fund	July 10 2020	£2.2M in funding for music venues to cover fixed costs which include rent, non-furloughed staff, servicing debts and utilities	Music venue direct funding
Culture Recovery Plan – Scotland	August 28 2020	£59M (of £1.57B for the UK) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>£15M for the Culture Organisations and Venues Recovery Fund (grants of between £10,000 and £250,000 for organisations and venues affected by COVID-19)</li> <li>£21.3M for Historic Environment Scotland (HES) to protect jobs and support the reopening of properties in their care</li> <li>£5.9M to support heritage organisations through committed grants</li> <li>£270,000 for the New Landmark Trust</li> <li>£5M to address immediate financial hardship faced by creative freelancers (Hardship Fund for Creative Freelancers and Screen Hardship Fund)</li> <li>£5M to support artists to continue developing new creative work that will make a significant contribution to Scotland's recovery from COVID-19, including £1.5M for the Culture Collective programme to support organisations employing freelance artists to work in communities across Scotland</li> <li>£3.5M for independent cinemas (Independent Cinema Recovery and Resilience Fund)</li> <li>£3M for youth arts including a funding boost for the Youth Music Initiative which will provide work for musicians</li> </ul>	Arts infrastructure & direct funding to artists and organisations

Policy	Date Announced	Value [STERLING]	Arts Specific/Broad
<b>Wales</b>			
Untitled	April 01 2020	£18M <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• £7M for the Arts Resilience Fund specifically for artists and arts organisations least likely to benefit from other support programs</li> <li>• £8M Sport Resilience Fund</li> <li>• £1M for Creative Wales to support live music venues (up to £25,000 per business) response to immediate financial stress</li> <li>• £1M for Cultural Resilience Fund to help museums, collections, conservation services, archives and public libraries respond to short-term pressures/ recovery actions</li> <li>• £750,000 for Emergency Relief Fund to support smallest/most vulnerable independent sport, museum and heritage organisations with cash flow issues</li> <li>• £250,000 for Digital Library Resources to enable libraries to provide resources to the public during isolation</li> </ul>	Arts infrastructure and direct funding to arts organisations
Cultural Recovery Plan – Wales (aka Cultural Recovery Fund)	July 30 2020	£59M (of 1.57B for the UK) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• £27.5M be distributed by Arts Council of Wales to cultural organisations significantly affected by COVID-19</li> <li>• £18.5M million to be distributed by the Welsh government to other cultural sectors affected by COVID-19, including music venues; recording and rehearsal studios; Heritage organisations and historic attractions; accredited museums and archive services; libraries; events and their technical support suppliers; independent cinemas and the publishing sector</li> <li>• £7M for creative freelancers affected by COVID-19 via grants of £2500</li> <li>• £6M unallocated</li> </ul>	Arts infrastructure and direct funding for individual artists

Policy	Date Announced	Value [STERLING]	Arts Specific/Broad
<b>Northern Ireland</b>			
Creative Support Fund	April 27 2020	£1.5M in grants for individuals (£5,000 max via Artists Emergency Programme) and organisations (£25,000 max via Organisational Emergency Programme) affected by COVID-19	Direct funding for individual artists
Cultural Recovery Plan – Northern Ireland	July 05 2020	£33M (of £1.57B for the UK)	Arts infrastructure
Individuals Emergency Resilience Programme	August 04 2020	£1.1M (£3M additional funding from UK Cultural Recovery Fund) in grants of £1,200, £3,000 or £5,000 to help individuals working in the creative economy during the COVID-19 crisis	Direct funding for artists
Health and Safety Capital Programme	September 10 2020	\$500,000 to support arts and culture organisations as they prepare to re-open after the COVID-19 lockdown	Direct funding for arts organisations
Stability and Renewal Programme for Organisations (from UK Culture Recovery Fund)	October 28 2020	£7.75 million in grants (£500,000 max) for organisations working in the arts and cultural sector to help them respond to the immediate impacts of the COVID-19 crisis, including help with re-opening, adapting and stabilising their organisations in the long-term	Direct funding for arts organisations

**Creative People, Products and Places (CP3) is a research centre based at the University of South Australia.**

**Director:** Susan Luckman

**Associate Directors:** Justin O'Connor and Saige Walton

CP3 seeks to be a leader in high quality research for policy makers, cultural communities and institutions, creative practitioners and industries, helping to provide new evidence-based perspectives that the sector requires for post-pandemic recovery and sustainable development.

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**ISBN-978-0-6450182-0-2** Electronic Version

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